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ARTICLES
ALGORITHMIC JIM CROW
Margaret Hu*
This Article contends that current immigration- and security-related
vetting protocols risk promulgating an algorithmically driven form of Jim
Crow. Under the “separate but equal” discrimination of a historic Jim Crow
regime, state laws required mandatory separation and discrimination on the
front end, while purportedly establishing equality on the back end. In
contrast, an Algorithmic Jim Crow regime allows for “equal but separate”
discrimination. Under Algorithmic Jim Crow, equal vetting and database
screening of all citizens and noncitizens will make it appear that fairness and
equality principles are preserved on the front end. Algorithmic Jim Crow,
however, will enable discrimination on the back end in the form of designing,
interpreting, and acting upon vetting and screening systems in ways that
result in a disparate impact.
Currently, security-related vetting protocols often begin with an
algorithm-anchored technique of biometric identification—for example, the
collection and database screening of scanned fingerprints and irises, digital
photographs for facial recognition technology, and DNA. Immigration
reform efforts, however, call for the biometric data collection of the entire
citizenry in the United States to enhance border security efforts and to
increase the accuracy of the algorithmic screening process. Newly
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developed big data vetting tools fuse biometric data with biographic data and
internet and social media profiling to algorithmically assess risk.
This Article concludes that those individuals and groups disparately
impacted by mandatory vetting and screening protocols will largely fall
within traditional classifications—race, color, ethnicity, national origin,
gender, and religion. Disparate-impact consequences may survive judicial
review if based upon threat risk assessments, terroristic classifications, datascreening results deemed suspect, and characteristics establishing
anomalous data and perceived foreignness or dangerousness data—
nonprotected categories that fall outside of the current equal protection
framework. Thus, Algorithmic Jim Crow will require an evolution of equality
law.
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INTRODUCTION
During the 2016 presidential campaign, then-candidate Donald J. Trump
announced his intention to impose a “Muslim Ban,” which would prohibit
Muslim entry into the United States1 as part of his counterterrorism strategy.
1. See, e.g., Jeremy Diamond, Donald Trump: Ban All Muslim Travel to U.S., CNN
(Dec. 8, 2015, 4:18 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/07/politics/donald-trump-muslimban-immigration/ [https://perma.cc/L3D4-UMHX]. Immigration, constitutional, and national
security experts have offered perspectives on the ongoing legal challenges surrounding the
Travel Ban. See generally Margaret Hu, Crimmigration-Counterterrorism and the Travel
Ban, 2017 WIS. L. REV. (forthcoming) (citing Adam Cox, Why a Muslim Ban Is Likely to Be
Held Unconstitutional: The Myth of Unconstrained Immigration Power, JUSTSECURITY (Jan.
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Shortly before his election, Trump also announced a proposal for the
“extreme vetting” of immigrants and refugees.2 Trump clarified that “[t]he
Muslim ban is something that in some form has morphed into a[n] extreme
vetting [protocol] from certain areas of the world.”3
On January 27, 2017, during his first week as president, Trump signed
Executive Order 13,769, titled “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist
Entry into the United States” (the “January 27, 2017, Order”).4 Litigation
concerning the constitutionality of this Executive Order5 focused on sections
3 and 5(c), provisions that relate to barring the entry of travelers and refugees
from specific Muslim-majority countries into the United States.6 These
controversial provisions were challenged as violating equal protection, due
process, and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, among other
constitutional and statutory claims.7
On March 6, 2017, President Trump issued a revised Executive Order (the
“March 6 2017, Order”), Executive Order 13,780. Issued under the same title
as the January 27, 2017, Order, “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist
Entry into the United States,” the March 6, 2017, Order superseded the

30, 2017, 10:21 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/36988/muslim-ban-held-unconstitutionalmyth-unconstrained-immigration-power/ [https://perma.cc/H234-52N2]; then citing Mark
Tushnet, Mootness and the Travel Ban, BALKINIZATION (June 2, 2017, 1:18 AM)
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/06/mootness-and-travel-ban.html [https://perma.cc/2LNRJ67T]; then citing Marty Lederman, Unlocking the Mysteries of the Supreme Court’s Entry
Ban Case, JUSTSECURITY (June 27, 2017, 8:01 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/
42577/mysteries-trump-v-irap/ [https://perma.cc/JAM4-D97M]; and then citing Leah Litman
& Steve Vladeck, How the President’s “Clarifying” Memorandum Destroys the Case for the
Entry Ban, JUSTSECURITY (June 15, 2017, 8:01 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/
42166/presidents-clarifying-memorandum-destroys-case-entry-ban/ [https://perma.cc/6APKMZGL]).
2. Gerhard Peters & John T. Wooley, Presidential Debate at Washington University in
St.
Louis,
Missouri,
AM.
PRESIDENCY
PROJECT
(Oct.
9,
2016),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=119038 [https://perma.cc/A79V-TLVW];
see also Peter Margulies, Bans, Borders, and Justice: Judicial Review of Immigration Law in
the Trump Administration at 35–48 (Roger Williams Univ. Sch. of Law, Research Paper No.
177, 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3029655 [https://perma.cc/E5DP-UDQQ] (arguing for a
more searching judicial review of “extreme vetting” and the need to recognize the significant
long-term impact of “extreme vetting”).
3. Peters & Wooley, supra note 2.
4. Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Feb. 1, 2017) [hereinafter January 27,
2017, Order].
5. See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1157 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
6. January 27, 2017, Order, supra note 4, §§ 3, 5(c).
7. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 760 (9th Cir.) (per curiam) (alleging
violations of the Establishment Clause, the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth Amendment (both procedural and substantive claims), the Immigration and Nationality
Act, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act), cert.
granted, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554,
578–79 (4th Cir.) (claiming violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Refugee Act,
and the Administrative Procedure Act), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017); Washington,
847 F.3d at 1157, 1165, 1167 (alleging that the Executive Order violates that First
Amendment’s Establishment Clause, due process, and equal protection); Darweesh v. Trump,
17 Civ. 480 (AMD), 2017 WL 388504 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2017) (alleging that the Executive
Order violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses).
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January 27, 2017, Order.8 However, it left the extreme vetting provisions of
the January 27, 2017, Order in place,9 and, in fact, expanded the vetting
requirements in several respects.10 The extreme vetting requirements of the
March 6, 2017, Order are now most fully articulated in section 5, titled
“Implementing Uniform Screening and Vetting Standards for All
Immigration Programs.”11
The travel restrictions and the vetting requirements were expanded yet
again in a third iteration of the “Muslim Ban,” also referred to as the “Travel
Ban” or the “Entry Ban.” On September 24, 2017, shortly before oral
argument was scheduled for the U.S. Supreme Court on October 10, 2017, in
the consolidated Travel Ban cases of Trump v. Hawaii and Trump v.
International Refugee Assistance Project,12 President Trump signed a new
Proclamation (the “September 24, 2017, Order”).13 The September 24, 2017,
Order is titled, “Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting
Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety
Threats.”14 Thus, the most recent Order, as implied by the title, focuses more
squarely on the extreme vetting provisions set forth by the prior Orders.
More specifically, sections 1(a) through (h) of the September 24, 2017, Order
focus on “identity-management and information-sharing capabilities,
protocols, and practices” related to immigration screening and vetting.15 The
next day, the Court ordered briefing as to whether the Travel Ban cases that
had been scheduled for oral argument on October 10, 2017, were moot.16 At
the time of publication, the litigation remains ongoing, including challenges
to the September 24, 2017, Order.17
8. Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017) [hereinafter March 6,
2017, Order].
9. Id. §§ 1–2; see also id. § 5 (“Implementing Uniform Screening and Vetting Standards
for All Immigration Programs”).
10. Compare id., with January 27, 2017, Order, supra note 4, § 4.
11. March 6, 2017, Order, supra note 8, § 5.
12. 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017).
13. Presidential Proclamation, Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for
Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats
(Sept. 24, 2017) [hereinafter “September 24, 2017, Order”], https://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2017/09/24/enhancing-vetting-capabilities-and-processes-detecting-attemptedentry [https://perma.cc/R678-KL5F].
14. Id.
15. Id.; see also infra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. Department of
Homeland Security definition of “identity management”).
16. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, Nos. 16-1436, 16-1540, slip op. (U.S. Sept.
25,
2017),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/092517zr_jiel.pdf
[https://perma.cc/24F6-5MFB] (ordering parties to file letter briefs addressing whether, or to
what extent, the Proclamation issued on September 24, 2017, may render the consolidated
cases moot).
17. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 26–27, Iranian Alliances
Across Borders, Univ. of Md. Coll. Park Chapter v. Trump, No. 8:17-cv-02921-GJH (D. Md.
Oct. 2, 2017) (seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from the September 24, 2017, Order
and alleging that the Order violates the antidiscrimination provision of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A) (2012)); Letter from ACLU to Hon. Theodore D.
Chuang, U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Md. (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/letter/irapv-trump-pmc-letter [https://perma.cc/KKL8-DM8W] (seeking to amend the complaint in
International Refugee Assistance Project in light of the September 24, 2017, Order); see also
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Regardless of the final disposition of these litigation matters, it is
significant to note that the extreme vetting provisions of the original and
revised Executive Orders have received less judicial attention than the travel
restrictions.18 The extreme vetting provisions do not appear to be dependent
upon the authority of the Orders, and are presented in the Orders as an
evolving and prospective administrative matter.19 Thus, the vetting
provisions of the March 6, 2017, Order and the September 24, 2017, Order
may not be fully challenged.20
This Article focuses on the long-term impact of modern vetting
requirements, such as those prescribed in the Executive Orders referenced
above,21 and other immigration-related screening protocols that are
increasingly algorithmically anchored. It contends that the implementation
of expanded vetting protocols22 risks implications that may be
undertheorized due to an underappreciation of the mass cybersurveillance
and disparate-impact consequences that surround current screening measures
broadly promulgated by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Specifically, this Article advances the claim that DHS vetting and screening

Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, Brennan Ctr. for Justice at N.Y. Univ.
Sch. of Law v. U.S. Dep’t. of State, No. 1:17-cv-07520 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2017) (seeking
disclosure of reports referred to in sections 1(c) and 1(h) of the September 24, 2017, Order,
pursuant to the disclosure requirements of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552
(2012)).
18. Litigation surrounding the March 6, 2017, Order addressed sections 2 and 6, which
bar the entry of travelers from six designated countries and limit refugee admissions. See
Hawaii, 859 F.3d at 757–59; Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 574–75.
19. The implementation of “extreme vetting” measures appears to be underway. See
Notice of Modified Privacy Act System of Records, 82 Fed. Reg. 179 (Sept. 18, 2017); 60Day Notice of Proposed Information Collection: Supplemental Questions for Visa Applicants,
82 Fed. Reg. 148 (Aug. 3, 2017).
20. See, e.g., Hu, supra note 1; Margulies, supra note 2. Increasing attention has been
focused on the efficacy of the social media screening of immigration vetting protocols. See,
e.g., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-17-40, DHS’ PILOTS FOR
SOCIAL MEDIA SCREENING NEED INCREASED RIGOR TO ENSURE SCALABILITY AND LONG-TERM
SUCCESS
(2017),
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2017/OIG-17-40Feb17.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ACP-GU2G]; Lily Hay Newman, Feds Monitoring Social
Media Does More Harm Than Good, WIRED (Sept. 28, 2017, 8:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/dhs-social-media-immigrants-green-card/
[https://perma.cc/2FC5-FPKC].
21. January 27, 2017, Order, supra note 4, § 4; March 6, 2017, Order, supra note 8, § 5;
September 24, 2017, Order, supra note 13, § 1(a)-(h).
22. As a presidential candidate, Trump announced his plans to implement a program of
“extreme vetting” of immigrants and refugees in a campaign speech on the Islamic State of
Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in August 2016. See Jeremy Diamond, Trump Proposes Values Test for
Would-Be Immigrants in Fiery ISIS Speech, CNN (Aug. 15, 2016, 9:39 PM)
http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/14/politics/donald-trump-isis-fight/index.html
[https://perma.cc/8GU4-9AEK]. Several scholars have observed that the president enjoys
wide powers in the exercise of immigration law and policy, especially through executive
action. See, e.g., Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law,
119 YALE L.J. 458, 500 (2009); Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and
Immigration Law Redux, 125 YALE L.J. 104, 108 (2015).
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protocols risk introducing an algorithmically driven and technologically
enhanced form of Jim Crow.23
Unlike the “separate but equal”24 de jure discrimination25 of a historic Jim
Crow regime, Algorithmic Jim Crow risks imposing both de jure and de facto
discrimination26 through an “equal but separate”27 regime. This Article
explains how Algorithmic Jim Crow is an outgrowth of a digital era that

23. See generally JONATHAN SCOTT HOLLOWAY, JIM CROW WISDOM: MEMORY AND
IDENTITY IN BLACK AMERICA SINCE 1940 (2013); JUMPIN’ JIM CROW: SOUTHERN POLITICS
FROM CIVIL WAR TO CIVIL RIGHTS (Jane Dailey et al. eds., 2000); Mattias Smångs, Doing
Violence, Making Race: Southern Lynching and White Racial Group Formation, 121 AM. J.
SOC. 1329 (2016). For contemporary discussions on the complexity of what has been termed
a “post-racial” America, see generally DEVON W. CARBADO & MITU GULATI, ACTING WHITE?
RETHINKING RACE IN “POST-RACIAL” AMERICA (2013); THE NEW BLACK: WHAT HAS
CHANGED—AND WHAT HAS NOT—WITH RACE IN AMERICA (Kenneth W. Mack & Guy-Uriel
E. Charles eds., 2013); Charlton McIlwain, Racial Formation, Inequality and the Political
Economy of Web Traffic, 20 INFO. COMM. & SOC’Y 1073 (2016); Angela Onwuachi-Willig,
Policing the Boundaries of Whiteness: The Tragedy of Being “Out of Place” from Emmett
Till to Trayvon Martin, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1113 (2017); Camille Gear Rich, Marginal
Whiteness, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1497 (2010); infra Part I.A.
24. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550–51 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954) (“[W]e cannot say that a law which authorizes or even requires the
separation of the two races in public conveyances is unreasonable . . . .”).
25. The Supreme Court has characterized de jure discrimination as encompassing statesanctioned or state-imposed discrimination under the law, prohibited under the Equal
Protection Clause. See, e.g., Brown, 347 U.S. at 490 (explaining that the Fourteenth
Amendment “proscrib[es] all state-imposed discriminations against the Negro race”).
26. Nonracial classifications that result in de facto discrimination or disparate-impact
discrimination may not be found to violate the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 (1977) (explaining that the
party asserting an equal protection violation bears the burden to show that the governmental
action was intended to discriminate against a suspect or protected class); Milliken v. Bradley,
418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974) (distinguishing de jure and de facto segregation with express and
explicit policies that articulate race-based distinctions defined as de jure discrimination); see
also Frank I. Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical
Analysis, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 275, 275 (1972); Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and
Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 494, 496–97 (2003).
27. See infra Part III.A.
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exploits cybersurveillance28 and dataveillance29 systems that are rapidly
proliferating in both the public30 and private sectors.31
This Article demonstrates how immigration-related vetting and database
screening protocols utilize newly developed big data32 screening, tracking,
and profiling tools that attempt to verify identity and assess future risk.33
These tools are now actively deployed by DHS34 and utilize databases

28. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0, at 209 (2006) (“[Cybersurveillance
is] the process by which some form of human activity is analyzed by a computer according to
some specified rule . . . . [T]he critical feature in each [case of surveillance] is that a computer
is sorting data for some follow-up review by some human.”).
29. See generally Roger A. Clarke, Information Technology and Dataveillance, 31 COMM.
ACM 498 (1988). Roger Clarke describes dataveillance as “the systematic use of personal
data systems in the investigation or monitoring of the actions or communications of one or
more persons.” Id. at 499; see also DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE STUDIES: AN OVERVIEW 16
(2007) (“Being much cheaper than direct physical or electronic surveillance[, dataveillance]
enables the watching of more people or populations, because economic constraints to
surveillance are reduced. Dataveillance also automates surveillance. Classically, government
bureaucracies have been most interested in gathering such data . . . .”).
30. See, e.g., GLENN GREENWALD, NO PLACE TO HIDE: EDWARD SNOWDEN, THE NSA, AND
THE U.S. SURVEILLANCE STATE 6 (2014). See generally SHANE HARRIS, @WAR: THE RISE OF
THE MILITARY-INTERNET COMPLEX (2014); LYON, supra note 29; DANA PRIEST & WILLIAM M.
ARKIN, TOP SECRET AMERICA: THE RISE OF THE NEW AMERICAN SECURITY STATE (2011);
JEFFREY ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD: RECLAIMING SECURITY AND FREEDOM IN AN ANXIOUS
AGE (2005); Deven R. Desai, Constitutional Limits on Surveillance: Associational Freedom
in the Age of Data Hoarding, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579 (2014); Anil Kalhan, Immigration
Surveillance, 74 MD. L. REV. 1 (2014); Paul Ohm, Electronic Surveillance Law and the IntraAgency Separation of Powers, 47 U.S.F. L. REV. 269 (2012); Neil M. Richards, The Dangers
of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934 (2013).
31. See, e.g., JULIA ANGWIN, DRAGNET NATION: A QUEST FOR PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND
FREEDOM IN A WORLD OF RELENTLESS SURVEILLANCE 17–18 (2014); ROBERT O’HARROW, JR.,
NO PLACE TO HIDE, 221–23 (2005); see also Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers:
How ChoicePoint and Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for
Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 595, 596 (2004); Jeffrey Rosen, The
Deciders: Facebook, Google, and the Future of Privacy and Free Speech, in CONSTITUTION
3.0: FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 69, 69–72 (Jeffrey Rosen & Benjamin Wittes
eds., 2011).
32. See generally ROB KITCHIN, THE DATA REVOLUTION: BIG DATA, OPEN DATA, DATA
INFRASTRUCTURES & THEIR CONSEQUENCES (2014); VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER &
KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK,
AND THINK (2013); PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: FRAMEWORKS FOR
ENGAGEMENT (Julia Lane et al. eds., 2014).
33. See, e.g., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE FOR THE
FUTURE ATTRIBUTE SCREENING TECHNOLOGY (FAST)/PASSIVE METHODS FOR PRECISION
BEHAVIORAL SCREENING 5 (2011), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia
_st_fast-a.pdf [https://perma.cc/YQ4W-VM5P].
34. See, e.g., Refugee Processing and Security Screening, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR.
SERVICES (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.uscis.gov/refugeescreening [https://perma.cc/4Z6RC3QQ].
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operated by the military35 and intelligence communities.36 Currently, vetting
and screening protocols often begin with biometric identification37—for
example, the digital collection and screening of scanned fingerprints through
federal and state biometric databases in the United States and international
biometric databases, such as those operated by ICPO-INTERPOL
(Interpol).38 Biometric data currently collected by DHS include scanned
fingerprints39 and irises,40 digital photos for facial recognition technology,41
and DNA.42
Consequently, implementation of extreme vetting protocols will likely
include proposals for a tamper-resistant and fraud-proof biometric electronic
identity card,43 such as a biometric ePassport.44 The Trump administration’s
Executive Orders, for example, specifically mandate “Expedited Completion
of the Biometric Entry-Exit Tracking System” by DHS.45 As part of new
35. Current refugee vetting procedures include database screening through the U.S.
Department of Defense’s Defense Forensics and Biometrics Agency’s (DFBA) Automated
Biometric Identification System (ABIS). Id. (“A biometric record check of the Department of
Defense’s (DOD) records collected in areas of conflict (predominantly Iraq and Afghanistan).
DOD screening began in 2007 for Iraqi applicants and has now been expanded to all
nationalities.”).
36. Current refugee vetting procedures include database screening through the “National
Counterterrorism Center/Terrorist Screening Center (terrorist watch lists)” and the “FBI
Fingerprint Check through Next Generation Identification (NGI).” Id.
37. Biometrics is “[t]he science of automatic identification or identity verification of
individuals using physiological or behavioral characteristics.” JOHN VACCA, BIOMETRIC
TECHNOLOGIES AND VERIFICATION SYSTEMS 589 (2007).
38. See Databases, INTERPOL, https://www.interpol.int/INTERPOL-expertise/
Databases [https://perma.cc/RVM3-JKJ6] (last visited Oct. 16, 2017).
39. See, e.g., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE
AUTOMATED BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (IDENT) 15 (2012), https://www.dhs.gov/
sites/default/files/publications/privacy/PIAs/privacy_pia_usvisit_ident_appendixj_jan2013.p
df [https://perma.cc/2LW4-PJSS]; Office of Biometric Identity Management Identification
Services, DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, https://www.dhs.gov/obim-biometric-identificationservices [https://perma.cc/VN5T-H6UH] (last visited Oct. 16, 2017).
40. See, e.g., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE IRIS AND
FACE TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATION AND EVALUATION (IFTDE) 2 (2010),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy_pia_st_iftde.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A9MP-CRCF].
41. See, e.g., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE FOR THE
STANDOFF TECHNOLOGY INTEGRATION AND DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM: BIOMETRIC OPTICAL
SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM TESTS 2 (2012), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
privacy_pia_st_stidpboss_dec2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7XK-EDK9].
42. See, e.g., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE RAPID
DNA SYSTEM 2 (2013), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-piarapiddna-20130208.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9NN-F4PL].
43. See, e.g., Charles E. Schumer & Lindsey O. Graham, The Right Way to Mend
Immigration, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/03/17/AR2010031703115.html
[https://perma.cc/Y5GF-WE2M]
(“We would require all U.S. citizens and legal immigrants who want jobs to obtain a hightech, fraud-proof Social Security card. Each card’s unique biometric identifier would be stored
only on the card . . . .”).
44. See, e.g., Eric Markowitz, Retina Scanners and Biometric Passports: A Look at the
Futuristic Tech That Could Scan Refugees, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2015, 11:29 AM),
http://www.ibtimes.com/retina-scanners-biometric-passports-look-futuristic-tech-could-scanrefugees-2199960 [https://perma.cc/6AZC-3EV9].
45. March 6, 2017, Order, supra note 8, § 8; January 27, 2017, Order, supra note 4, § 7.
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vetting protocols, DHS also seeks social media identification data46 and plans
to seek social media user credentials,47 such as passwords to Facebook
accounts of refugees and visa applicants.48 Newly developed “big data”
cybersurveillance tools fuse biometric data with biographic data and internet
and social media profiling to assess risk.49
This Article aims to explain how big data vetting is mistakenly presented
as a procedure that is restricted to noncitizens: immigrants, refugee and
asylum applicants, and visitors seeking a travel visa to the United States.
Instead, such vetting is part of a web of technologies that DHS has termed
“identity management.”50 The application of these technologies may
eventually extend to the entire citizenry through a variety of policy proposals,
including a biometric national identification system, and various mandatory
vetting and database screening programs. Identity-management programs
attempt to authenticate identity and assess the risk factors across entire
populations, including the U.S. citizenry. Big data vetting, thus, is
misunderstood as a protocol that is likely to be limited to immigration-related
screening. More accurately, such vetting includes an evolving form of big
data surveillance that attempts to assess criminal and terroristic risk across
entire populations and subpopulations through mass data collection, database
screening and data fusion, artificial intelligence, and algorithm-driven
predictive analytics.51
46. John Burnett, Former Immigration Director Defends U.S. Record on Refugee Vetting,
NPR (Feb. 3, 2017, 4:35 PM), http://www.npr.org/2017/02/03/513311323/formerimmigration-director-defends-u-s-record-on-refugee-vetting [https://perma.cc/U99Q-RWT5]
(noting that the former director of the Office of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services of
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security under the Obama administration “point[ed] out
that his office had been checking Facebook, Twitter and Instagram accounts of prospective
refugees from Syria and Iraq since 2015”).
47. Alexander Smith, U.S. Visitors May Have to Hand over Social Media Passwords:
DHS, NBC NEWS (Feb. 8, 2017, 7:51 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/usvisitors-may-have-hand-over-social-media-passwords-kelly-n718216
[https://perma.cc/7WK4-FDKB].
48. See id.; see also Notice of Modified Privacy Act System of Records, 82 Fed. Reg. 179
(Sept. 18, 2017).
49. See, e.g., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 33; see also infra Part I.A.
50. DHS offers this definition of identity management:
Identity Management (IdM) deals with identifying and managing individuals within
a government, state, local, public, or private sector network or enterprise. In
addition, authentication and authorization to access resources such as facilities or,
sensitive data within that system are managed by associating user rights,
entitlements, and privileges with the established identity.
Cyber Security Division Identity Management Program Video, DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY,
https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/cyber-security-division-identity-managementprogram-video [https://perma.cc/9NGG-8G28] (last visited Oct. 16, 2016).
51. See, e.g., STEVEN FINLAY, PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS, DATA MINING AND BIG DATA:
MYTHS, MISCONCEPTIONS AND METHODS 3 (2014); ERIC SIEGEL, PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS: THE
POWER TO PREDICT WHO WILL CLICK, BUY, LIE, OR DIE 59–60 (2013); NATE SILVER, THE
SIGNAL AND THE NOISE: WHY SO MANY PREDICTIONS FAIL—BUT SOME DON’T 417–18 (2012);
see also Spencer Woodman, Palantir Provides the Engine for Donald Trump’s Deportation
Machine, INTERCEPT (Mar. 2, 2017, 1:18 PM), https://theintercept.com/2017/03/02/palantirprovides-the-engine-for-donald-trumps-deportation-machine/ [https://perma.cc/4B2H-JLHV]
(reporting that the DHS awarded a private contractor a $41 million contract to build an
“Investigative Case Management” system to allow DHS to “access a vast ‘ecosystem’ of data
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The long-term consequences of modern big data surveillance can be better
envisioned by anticipating how and why big data vetting protocols may be
extended to the entire population. Eventually, all residents of the United
States, both citizens and noncitizens, may face various stages of
technological vetting and algorithmic screening as a part of a post-September
11, 2001, national security policy trajectory that embraces big data
surveillance for its presumed efficacy. Importantly, in parallel with the
extreme vetting protocols mandated by the Executive Orders, almost every
immigration reform effort since 9/11 has called for biometric data collection
from the entire citizenry in the United States to enhance border security
efforts.52 At the same time, increasing concern regarding homegrown
terrorism has resulted in a call to extend domestic surveillance and
counterterrorism efforts to both citizens and noncitizens.53 The Snowden
disclosures, for example, have further revealed how foreign-intelligencegathering tools, such as bulk metadata collection, can be indiscriminate in
scope and impact both citizens and noncitizens.54
Identifying the vetting procedures embedded within Executive Order
13,769 and the constitutional challenges which followed its promulgation is
particularly appropriate as 2017 marks the seventy-fifth anniversary of the
signing of Executive Order 9066 by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt.55
That order, issued on February 19, 1942, and titled “Authorizing the
Secretary of War to Prescribe Military Areas,” allowed for Japanese
internment by delegating to the Secretary of War the authority “to take such
other steps as he . . . may deem advisable to enforce compliance” with the
exclusion of Japanese Americans and those of Japanese ancestry.56
The legal challenges mounted against Executive Order 9066 culminated in
several U.S. Supreme Court cases, most notably, Korematsu v. United
States.57 In this case, decided in 1944, the Court upheld the constitutionality

to facilitate immigration officials in both discovering targets and then creating and
administering cases against them”).
52. See Margaret Hu, Biometric ID Cybersurveillance, 88 IND. L.J. 1475, 1478–82 (2013).
53. See, e.g., Countering Violent Extremism, DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY (Jan. 19, 2017),
https://www.dhs.gov/countering-violent-extremism [https://perma.cc/5CS6-TL7X]; see also
TREVOR AARONSON, THE TERROR FACTORY: INSIDE THE FBI’S MANUFACTURED WAR ON
TERRORISM 19 (2013); Colin Moynihan, A New York City Settlement on the Surveillance of
Muslims, NEW YORKER (Jan. 7, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/a-newyork-city-settlement-on-surveillance-of-muslims [https://perma.cc/X6J9-Y2EQ] (“After the
attacks of September 11, 2001, the New York Police Department began an intense surveillance
operation that focused on Muslims in New York City . . . . They eavesdropped on
conversations in restaurants and cafes, catalogued memberships in mosques and student
organizations, and . . . tried to bait people into making inflammatory statements.”).
54. See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional
Considerations, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 757, 863–64 (2014); Laura K. Donohue, Section
702 and the Collection of International Telephone and Internet Content, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 117, 151–52, 157, 164 n.83, 202–19 (2015).
55. Exec. Order No. 9066, 3 C.F.R. §§ 1092–93 (1942).
56. Id.
57. 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)
(“Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious
to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.”).
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of Executive Order 9066, reasoning in part: “[W]e are dealing specifically
with nothing but an exclusion order. To cast this case into outlines of racial
prejudice, without reference to the real military dangers which were
presented, merely confuses the issue.”58 Drawing comparisons between
Executive Order 13,769 and Executive Order 9066, and reviewing the
original justification for Japanese internment, is critical here as President
Trump and others have cited both FDR’s actions59 and Korematsu as
precedent for the Muslim Ban and the development of a Muslim registry
database.60
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes how modern vetting
procedures are intertwined with burgeoning identity-management systems.
Based on a review of publicly available information, these vetting protocols
are increasingly dependent upon the following: mass biometric data
collection, automated or semiautomated biometric identification, and
algorithm-dependent database screening programs. In a big data world,
threat risk assessments and data-profiling tools do not necessarily begin with
the identification of individuals on the basis of traditionally protected
classifications, such as race, ethnicity, or national origin. Instead, because
contemporary big data systems are data-classification oriented, vetting and
screening protocols begin with the identification of individuals on the basis
of numerical identification, such as passport numbers, and on the basis of
biometric identification, such as the cataloguing of scanned fingerprints and
irises.
Part II describes how national security programs risk creating forms of
discrimination similar to Jim Crow in that they are also based upon
classification and screening protocols. Historic Jim Crow regimes started
with a legal premise: that certain individuals could and should be classified
on the basis of race. Next, Jim Crow laws utilized screening systems to
enforce segregation based upon designated racial classification. This
discussion explores why security threat assessments produced through
algorithms and database screening may—similar to historic Jim Crow—also
separate populations based upon particular classifications. New Algorithmic
Jim Crow systems, like historic Jim Crow regimes, systems may present
themselves as facially neutral.

58. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223.
59. “What I’m doing is no different than FDR,” Trump told ABC News during the
presidential campaign. Meghan Keneally, Donald Trump Cites These FDR Policies to Defend
Muslim Ban, ABC NEWS (Dec. 8, 2015, 1:01 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/donaldtrump-cites-fdr-policies-defend-muslim-ban/story?id=35648128
[https://perma.cc/FY3H9NNE].
60. Shortly after President Trump’s election, Carl Higbie, a former spokesman for the
Great America Political Action Committee, stated on Fox News that a Muslim database
registry would be legal and would “hold constitutional muster” under Korematsu, explaining,
“We did it during World War II with the Japanese . . . .” Derek Hawkins, Japanese American
Internment Is ‘Precedent’ for National Muslim Registry, Prominent Trump Backer Says,
WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morningmix/wp/2016/11/17/japanese-internment-is-precedent-for-national-muslim-registryprominent-trump-backer-says/ [https://perma.cc/SF5A-4HEK].
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Part III explains how identity-management systems do not necessarily
discriminate based on protected categories recognized under equal protection
jurisprudence.61 Rather, newly emerging vetting systems are often centered
on big data and generally driven by mass data collection and analysis. These
systems, for instance, purport to be race neutral and not to target individuals
based on a protected classification. Rather, it is often the case that results of
data screening and vetting analytics deemed suspect and anomalous are
isolated and targeted. Consequently, the “equal but separate” consequences
of Algorithmic Jim Crow will allow for the “equal” vetting and screening of
all citizens and noncitizens. At the same time, newly deployed vetting
systems will allow federal and state governments to “separate” individuals
based upon the vetting and screening actions mandated through security
policy developments.
Part IV further discusses why advocates of immigration federalism62 and
national security federalism63—those seeking the expansion of state
participation in the enforcement of federal immigration and national security
law—have increasingly enacted biometric data harvesting and identitymanagement laws that mimic federal laws and programs. These state laws
mandate the utilization of multiple dataveillance tools and biometric data
screening devices, purportedly to further crime and immigration control and
simultaneously support counterterrorism efforts. Yet, just as historic Jim
Crow regimes delegated segregationist gatekeeping duties to state and private
entities, contemporary immigration policy delegates restrictive immigration
gatekeeping duties to state and private entities. Under Algorithmic Jim
61. Equal protection jurisprudence and the foundations for differing standards of judicial
review based upon protected classification has yielded rich scholarship. See generally JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 105–81 (1980); Bruce
A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 714–16 (1985); Mario L.
Barnes et al., A Post-Race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 967 (2010); Katharine T. Bartlett,
Tradition as Past and Present in Substantive Due Process Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 535, 540–
48 (2012); Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities,
91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1294–97 (1982); Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin Color,
49 DUKE L.J. 1487 (2000); Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal
Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 219 (1991); Melissa Murray, Equal Rites and Equal Rights,
96 CALIF. L. REV. 1395 (2008); Bertrall L. Ross II, The Representative Equality Principle:
Disaggregating the Equal Protection Intent Standard, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 175 (2012); Jed
Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141, 1143 (2002); Kenji
Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748, 755–63 (2011).
62. Hiroshi Motomura is credited with introducing the term “immigration federalism” into
academic discourse to describe state and local involvement in immigration. Peter J. Spiro,
Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627, 1627 (1997); see also
Pratheepan Gulasekaram & S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, Immigration Federalism: A
Reappraisal, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2074, 2096 (2013); Clare Huntington, The Constitutional
Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787, 788 n.6 (2008) (crediting
Motomura with “defining immigration federalism as ‘states and localities play[ing a role] in
making and implementing law and policy relating to immigration and immigrants’” (citing
Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human Rights, and Immigration
Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1361 (1999))).
63. See, e.g., Matthew C. Waxman, National Security Federalism in the Age of Terror, 64
STAN. L. REV. 289, 289 (2012); see also Kris W. Kobach, Reinforcing the Rule of Law: What
States Can and Should Do to Reduce Illegal Immigration, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 459, 475
(2008).
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Crow, these technologically enabled gatekeeping duties involve race-neutral
database screening of personally identifiable data and biometric data through
federal vetting and screening protocols. The results, however, may not be
race neutral, or may in fact have a disparate impact on traditionally protected
classes.
Part IV further explains how technological vetting protocols and
algorithm-driven database screening systems may be insulated from
successful legal challenges, as the law has not yet adapted to anticipate new
forms of back-end discrimination facilitated by DHS’s rapid deployment of
identity-management programs. The government, as in Korematsu, will
likely defend any disparate-impact consequences as necessary and justified
based upon threat risk assessments and nonracial classifications. Risk-based
classifications and data characteristics deemed suspect fall outside of the
protections recognized by current equal protection jurisprudence. This type
of disparate impact, driven by database screening and technologically
enhanced discrimination, may face limited or lenient review by a federal
judiciary that generally grants broad deference to the government in matters
of immigration and national security.64 Thus, the advent of Algorithmic Jim
Crow will require an evolution of equality law.
This Article concludes that current algorithm-driven vetting and biometricbiographic identification screening, especially once deployed across the
entire citizenry, will likely lead to discriminatory profiling and surveillance
on the basis of suspicious data as well as classification-based discrimination.
These vetting and screening systems are likely to result in both direct and
disparate discrimination, particularly based on race, color, ethnicity, national
origin, and religion. In addition, recent immigration-control policy and
programs demonstrate the government’s interest in delegating immigrationvetting duties to private actors, such as employers, and nonfederal actors,
such as state and local law enforcement, which can exacerbate issues of racial
profiling and discrimination.
I. BIRTH OF ALGORITHMIC JIM CROW
When President Trump signed Executive Order 13,769 on January 27,
2017, then-acting Attorney General Sally Yates was taken by surprise.65
Yates reviewed the Order as well as a number of briefs by individuals who
sought to enjoin the Order in federal court and believed that it raised
constitutional problems—namely Establishment Clause and due process
concerns.66 Yates later explained to the New Yorker that, after reviewing
64. See, e.g., Shirin Sinnar, Rule of Law Tropes in National Security, 129 HARV. L. REV.
1566, 1569 (2016); see also Sahar F. Aziz, Policing Terrorists in the Community, 5 HARV.
NAT’L SECURITY J. 147, 222 (2014) (discussing counterterrism law enforcement).
65. See Ryan Lizza, Why Sally Yates Stood Up to Trump, NEW YORKER (May 29, 2017),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/05/29/why-sally-yates-stood-up-to-trump
[https://perma.cc/JHF9-73DM] (explaining that Yates learned of the Order upon being
notified by a deputy who read the news online).
66. Id. (“Yates read through the briefs, and thought that two arguments against the order
were particularly strong. . . . [The order] arguably violated the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment. And . . . there seemed to be serious due-process questions.”).
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arguments for and against the first Order, she thought that her two choices
were either to resign or to refuse to defend the Order.67 After reviewing the
evidence, Yates believed that the Order was ultimately based on religion and
said, “I thought back to Jim Crow laws, or literacy tests. Those didn’t say
that the purpose was to prevent African-Americans from voting. But that’s
what the purpose was.”68 Yates drafted a letter to her colleagues at the U.S.
Department of Justice, in which she stated: “At present, I am not convinced
that the defense of the Executive Order is consistent with these
responsibilities nor am I convinced that the Executive Order is lawful.”69
Yates directed Department of Justice attorneys not to defend the Order until
she determined that it was appropriate to act.70 A few hours later, Yates
received a letter from the White House that informed her that she had been
fired.71
Yates’s invocation of Jim Crow deserves notice. The former acting
Attorney General concluded that the Executive Order might lead to a
disparate impact on the basis of protected classifications such as national
origin and religion. At the same time, she also recognized that the Executive
Order presented itself as facially neutral, much like the facially neutral
literacy tests promulgated under Jim Crow laws that disproportionately
burdened the voting rights of minority communities.
Under historic Jim Crow, literacy tests, poll taxes, and other obstacles to
voting rights were equally applied to all voters.72 Although these obstacles
did not explicitly inquire into voters’ race, they nonetheless significantly
disenfranchised minority communities.
Therefore, they served
discriminatory ends even though the race of the voter was never technically
a basis for denying access to the ballot.73
Much like literacy tests and poll taxes, post-9/11 security initiatives may
disproportionately impact minority communities even though they do not
explicitly effectuate decisions based on protected attributes. An inquiry into
modern-day screening and vetting systems depends upon in an understanding
of myriad post-9/11 national security programs and policy initiatives.
Contemporary screening and vetting systems utilize algorithms to determine
a wide range of questions, including identity and associational assessments,
to gauge risk. For example, extreme vetting systems like the one
promulgated by the Executive Orders may bring about disproportionate
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Letter from Sally Yates, Acting Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, to Dep’t of Justice
(Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/01/30/us/document-Letter-FromSally-Yates.html [https://perma.cc/T7KF-HNUC].
70. Id.
71. Lizza, supra note 65 (“The statement was sent to thousands of department employees
around the country. About four hours later, at around 9 P.M., McGahn’s office asked the
senior Trump appointee to deliver a letter to Yates, notifying her that she had been fired.”).
72. See, e.g., Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, State’s Rights, Last Rites,
and Voting Rights, 47 CONN. L. REV. 481, 486 nn.23–24 (2014); Atiba R.Ellis, The Cost of the
Vote: Poll Taxes, Voter Identification Laws, and the Price of Democracy, 86 DENV. U. L.
REV. 1023, 1024 n.7 (2009).
73. Ellis, supra note 72, at 1040 n.79, 1041–50.
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burdens on minority communities. Potential discrimination facilitated or
exacerbated by technological means appearing to be facially neutral may
evade legal challenge requiring careful inquiry.
Because big data screening and tracking systems unfold in ways that are
difficult to see—for example, through algorithm-driven determinations,
internet-based database screening programs, and social media monitoring—
it is critical to explore how modern vetting protocols may be linked to
preexisting post-9/11 identity-management systems that are dependent upon
cybersurveillance and dataveillance tools. To grasp how extreme vetting can
be extended to the entire citizenry, it is helpful to compare No Fly database
screening systems with potential extreme vetting database screening systems.
For example, based on what is known of both programs, it appears that many
of the database screening protocols overlap.74 Part I, therefore, explains how
vetting systems will increasingly rely upon database screening, including
universal biometric databases, to sweep entire populations and subsets within
populations to assess terroristic and criminal risk.
To better understand the Trump administration’s policy on extreme
vetting, it is important to reconstruct the justification for such a policy based
upon historical background and prior policy developments implemented
during the Obama administration. Many of the policies advanced by the
Executive Order are not only an outgrowth of 9/11, but they are specifically
reactive to the Paris attacks in November 2015 and the San Bernardino attack
in December 2015. Both terrorist events led to multiple immigration policy
proposals and adjustments to current vetting procedures.
On the evening of November 13, 2015, coordinated terrorist attacks were
staged in Paris, France, which included mass shootings, suicide bombings,
and hostage takings.75 According to news reports, the terrorist attacks left
129 dead and 352 wounded, including ninety-nine in serious condition.76
The terrorist group Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) immediately
claimed responsibility.77
According to news accounts, ISIS announced immediately after the Paris
attacks that three teams of eight terrorists had carried them out.78 Seven of
the terrorists were reportedly killed through self-detonated suicide bombs.79
In the days following the attacks, intelligence reports indicated that at least

74. See, e.g., Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 62 F. Supp. 3d 909, 929 (N.D. Cal.
2014) (“By this order, all defendants shall specifically and thoroughly query the databases
maintained by them, such as the TSDB, TIDE, CLASS, KSTF, TECS, IBIS, TUSCAN,
TACTICS, and the no-fly and selectee lists . . . .”).
75. Adam Nossiter et al., Three Teams of Coordinated Attackers Carried Out Assault on
Paris, Officials Say; Hollande Blames ISIS, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/15/world/europe/paris-terrorist-attacks.html
[https://perma.cc/KSJ4-RLT5].
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Steve Almasy et al., Paris Massacre: At Least 128 Killed in Gunfire and Blasts,
French Officials Say, CNN (Nov. 14, 2015, 9:48 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/13/
world/paris-shooting/ [https://perma.cc/RU5V-Z3TM].
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three of the eight terrorists had used falsified passports.80 A passport found
on the body of a terrorist who had died at the Stade de France (“National
Stadium”) was reported to be an illegitimate Syrian passport and it was
reported that the terrorist had allegedly claimed Syrian refugee status in
France.81 Two other terrorists killed at the National Stadium allegedly
carried false Turkish passports.82 By November 19, 2015, just six days after
the attacks, the governors of thirty-one states had announced their refusal to
admit or resettle Syrian refugees in their respective states.83
One week after the Paris attacks, Michael Ignatieff, formerly the Edward
R. Murrow professor of public policy at the Harvard Kennedy School and
currently the rector and president of Central European University in
Budapest, expressed a position widely held by many experts: an international
biometric identification system would help to address the refugee crisis in
Europe and simultaneously serve national security interests.84 He stated that
“[t]he world badly needs a new migratory regime—based around an
internationally authorized biometric ID card, with a date of permitted entry
and a mandatory exit.”85 On November 24, 2015, while standing next to
then-President François Hollande of France less than two weeks after the
Paris attacks, then-President Barack Obama announced that “the [U.S.]
government was developing ‘biometric information and other technologies
that can make [refugee identification] more accurate.’”86
On December 2, 2015, fourteen people were killed and twenty-one were
seriously injured in a terrorist attack in San Bernardino, California.87 The
attack consisted of a mass shooting and an attempted bombing.88 The
perpetrators, Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik, a married couple
residing in California, targeted a San Bernardino County Department of

80. Christiane Amanpour & Thom Patterson, Passport Linked to Terrorist Complicates
Syrian Refugee Crisis, CNN (Nov. 15, 2015, 12:24 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/15/
europe/paris-attacks-passports/index.html [https://perma.cc/HLB4-SJUX].
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Ashley Fantz & Ben Brumfield, More Than Half the Nation’s Governors Say Syrian
Refugees Not Welcome, CNN (Nov. 19, 2015, 3:20 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/16/
world/paris-attacks-syrian-refugees-backlash/ [https://perma.cc/VW6W-8FFF] (reporting that
the many states refused to accept Syrian refugees for resettlement, including: Alabama,
Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Wisconsin, and Wyoming).
84. See Michael Ignatieff, The Refugees and the New War, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Dec. 17,
2015),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/12/17/refugees-and-new-war/
[https://perma.cc/5A9J-5L3V].
85. Id.; see also Katie Worth, Can Biometrics Solve the Refugee Debate?, PBS (Dec. 2,
2015), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/can-biometrics-solve-the-refugee-debate/
[https://perma.cc/XT36-TMK6].
86. Markowitz, supra note 44.
87. Michael S. Schmidt & Richard Pérez-Peña, F.B.I. Treating San Bernardino Attack as
Terrorism Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/05/us/
tashfeen-malik-islamic-state.html [https://perma.cc/MRP4-KFPJ].
88. Id.

2017]

ALGORITHMIC JIM CROW

649

Public Health holiday party.89 Farook, a Pakistani American U.S. citizen
born in Illinois, was employed by the Department of Public Health.90 Malik
was a Pakistani-born lawful permanent resident who had recently migrated
to the United States.91 According to media accounts, the Muslim couple had
been self-radicalized, inspired by ISIS.92
On the same day as the San Bernardino attack, Paul Ryan, Speaker of the
U.S. House of Representatives, explained that lawmakers were considering
various legislative reforms to increase security vetting of refugees and
immigrants in response to the threat of ISIS, including requiring countries “to
issue smart e-passports with biometric chips.”93
Less than one week later, in the immediate aftermath of the Paris and San
Bernardino attacks, then-presidential candidate Trump called for what has
been referred to as a “Muslim Ban” or “Travel Ban”: an executive action that
would prohibit entry of any Muslim into the United States.94 Trump did not
provide specifics on how he would prohibit Muslims from entering the
United States; however, he later clarified that the ban would be temporary to
allow the government to assess its current immigration procedures and
“suspend immigration from regions linked with terrorism.”95 Trump’s call
for a “Muslim Ban” was followed by calls for surveillance of Muslim
communities and mosques.96
Six months later, on June 12, 2016, Omar Mateen, an Afghani American
born in the United States, killed forty-nine people and wounded fifty-three in
a shooting rampage at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida.97 According
to news reports, Mateen had proclaimed allegiance to ISIS shortly before
committing “the worst mass shooting in United States history.”98 In the wake
of the Orlando attack, then-candidate Trump explained that the profiling of
Muslims in the United States was necessary as a preemptive measure to
prevent future attacks.99
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Lisa Lambert et al., House to Consider Changes to Visa Waiver Program, Including
‘Smart’ Passports, REUTERS (Dec. 2, 2015, 8:16 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/
12/02/us-usa-congress-visas-idUSKBN0TL1CV20151202 [https://perma.cc/W32F-SLZR].
94. See Diamond, supra note 1.
95. Associated Press, How Donald Trump’s Plan to Ban Muslims Has Evolved, FORTUNE
(June
28,
2016),
http://fortune.com/2016/06/28/donald-trump-muslim-ban/
[https://perma.cc/X29Y-XCPM].
96. See David Mark & Jeremy Diamond, Trump: ‘I Want Surveillance of Certain
Mosques,’ CNN (Nov. 21, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/21/politics/trump-muslimssurveillance/ [https://perma.cc/78YW-SQEV].
97. See Lizette Alvarez et al., Orlando Gunman Was ‘Cool and Calm’ After Massacre,
Police Say, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/14/us/orlandoshooting.html [https://perma.cc/8VX9-98WB].
98. Lizette Alvarez & Richard Pérez-Peña, Orlando Gunman Attacks Gay Nightclub,
Leaving 50 Dead, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/
13/us/orlando-nightclub-shooting.html [https://perma.cc/BP5N-6MHX].
99. See Emily Schultheis, Donald Trump: U.S. Must “Start Thinking About” Racial
Profiling, CBS NEWS (June 19, 2016), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/donald-trump-afterorlando-racial-profiling-not-the-worst-thing-to-do/ [https://perma.cc/8XG8-7E23].
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On August 16, 2016, Trump announced a proposal for the “extreme
vetting” of immigrants and refugees in a campaign speech on ISIS.100 He
explained: “In the Cold War, we had an ideological screening test. The time
is long overdue to develop a new screening test for the threats we face today.
I call it extreme vetting. I call it extreme, extreme vetting.”101 Then, on
August 31, 2016, Trump delivered an address on his proposed immigration
policy.102 In addition to his promise to build a wall on the southern border
of the United States and his reassertion that “Mexico will pay for the wall,”
Trump explained that he would also implement a “biometric entry-exit
system for tracking visa-holders.”103 These promises of enhanced national
security and border security systems, as well as the various Executive Orders
restricting travel, inherently represent technological developments in the
promulgation of emerging cybersurveillance technologies and algorithmicdriven screening and vetting protocols. To draw parallels between historic
Jim Crow and Algorithmic Jim Crow, this Article turns to an overview of Jim
Crow.
II. OVERVIEW OF JIM CROW:
CLASSIFICATION AND SCREENING SYSTEMS
Artificial intelligence and algorithms are not usually perceived as resulting
in discrimination. In fact, they may appear to be equality-compliant or even
equality-enhancing in that algorithmic screening and vetting can be applied
equally across entire populations and subpopulations. Screening and
classification systems, however, even when facially neutral and
algorithmically based, can lead to profound constitutional challenges. The
historical framing in this section is necessary to assist in the interrogation of
new classification and screening systems that are flourishing under security
rationales and presented as technologically objective and colorblind.
Therefore, to better grasp why the framing of Algorithmic Jim Crow is
now needed, Part II lays a factual predicate to explain the foundational legal
premises for historic Jim Crow regimes. Traditional Jim Crow laws first
required the government—often state and county governments—to engage
in formal and standardized protocols to assign racial classification to citizens
of that state or county. Once a racial classification system was determined
under the law, screening protocols, also established under Jim Crow laws,
enabled the separation of populations on the basis of that racial classification.
Consequently, understanding the basic mechanics of how separation was
enforced under the law begins with an understanding of historic Jim Crow
classification and screening systems.

100. See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 1.
101. Diamond, supra note 22.
102. Emily Schultheis, Donald Trump Doubles Down in Immigration Speech: “Mexico
Will Pay for the Wall,” CBS NEWS (Aug. 31, 2016), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/donaldtrump-delivers-immigration-speech-in-phoenix/ [https://perma.cc/E59J-RR2S].
103. Id.
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A. Historical Framing of Jim Crow
This overview is not intended to be an exhaustive history of the legal issues
and the nature of Jim Crow—other scholarship has addressed that subject in
thoughtful detail.104 Instead, this background intends to sketch out an
understanding of the scope and context of the Jim Crow era and to further
clarify that its laws and policies were not confined merely to segregating
locational sites and imposing restrictions on movement. Rather, Jim Crow
was:
[A] structure of exclusion and discrimination devised by white Americans
to be employed principally against black Americans . . . . Its central
purpose was to maintain a second-class social and economic status for
blacks while upholding a first-class social and economic status for
whites. . . . In the South, Jim Crow discrimination at its height existed not
only by statute but by custom and racial ‘etiquette,’ and it was rigidly
enforced by both the law enforcement agencies and courts as well as by
ordinary white citizens who were neither policemen nor judges but who
often took the law into their own hands as though they were.105

104. See generally 1 RACE, LAW, AND AMERICAN HISTORY 1700–1990: AFRICAN
AMERICANS AND THE LAW (Paul Finkelman ed., 1992); FRANK J. SCATURRO, THE SUPREME
COURT’S RETREAT FROM RECONSTRUCTION:
A DISTORTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE (2000); STEPHEN L. WASBY ET AL., DESEGREGATION FROM BROWN TO
ALEXANDER (1977); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (3d rev. ed.
2002); Gabriel J. Chin, Jim Crow’s Long Goodbye, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 107 (2004); Gabriel
J. Chin & Randy Wagner, The Tyranny of the Minority: Jim Crow and the CounterMajoritarian Difficulty, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 65 (2008); James W. Fox, Jr., Doctrinal
Myths and the Management of Cognitive Dissonance: Race, Law, and the Supreme Court’s
Doctrinal Support of Jim Crow, 34 STETSON L. REV. 293 (2005); James W. Fox, Jr.,
Intimations of Citizenship: Repressions and Expressions of Equal Citizenship in the Era of
Jim Crow, 50 HOW. L.J. 113 (2006); Rachel D. Godsil, Race Nuisance: The Politics of Law
in the Jim Crow Era, 105 MICH. L. REV. 505 (2006); Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness:
Trials of Racial Determination in the Nineteenth-Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109 (1998);
Trina Jones, Brown II: A Case of Missed Opportunity?, 24 L. & INEQ. 9 (2006); José Roberto
Juárez, Jr., Recovering Texas History: Tejanos, Jim Crow, Lynchings & the University of
Texas School of Law, 52 S. TEX. L. REV. 85 (2010); Kenneth W. Mack, Foreword: A Short
Biography of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 67 SMU L. REV. 229 (2014); Kenneth W. Mack,
Law, Society, Identity, and the Making of the Jim Crow South: Travel and Segregation on
Tennessee Railroads, 1875–1905, 24 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 377 (1999) [hereinafter Mack, Law,
Society, Identity]; Kenneth W. Mack, Rethinking Civil Rights Lawyering and Politics in the
Era Before Brown, 115 YALE L.J. 256 (2005); David Martin, The Birth of Jim Crow in
Alabama 1865–1896, 13 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 184 (1993); Jennifer Roback, Southern Labor Law
in the Jim Crow Era: Exploitative or Competitive, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161 (1984); Benno C.
Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era.
Part 1: The Heyday of Jim Crow, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 444 (1982); Barbara Y. Welke, Beyond
Plessy: Space, Status, and Race in the Era of Jim Crow, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 267; John W.
Wertheimer et al., “The Law Recognizes Racial Instinct”: Tucker v. Blease and the BlackWhite Paradigm in the Jim Crow South, 29 L. & HIST. REV. 471 (2011); Joseph R. Palmore,
Note, The Not-So-Strange Career of Interstate Jim Crow: Race, Transportation, and the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 1878–1946, 83 VA. L. REV. 1773 (1997); Anders Walker, Jim
Crow’s Unwritten Code, JOTWELL (Jan. 16, 2017), https://legalhist.jotwell.com/jim-crowsunwritten-code/ [https://perma.cc/K4EH-J6K7].
105. JERROLD M. PACKARD, AMERICAN NIGHTMARE: THE HISTORY OF JIM CROW vii–viii
(2002). For other sources on the history and impact of Jim Crow, see generally F. MICHAEL
HIGGINBOTHAM, GHOSTS OF JIM CROW: ENDING RACISM IN POST-RACIAL AMERICA (2013);
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One scholar explains that Jim Crow is a term for “a series [of] laws and
ordinances passed by Southern states and municipalities between 1877 and
1965 legalizing segregation (the physical separation of individuals based on
race, gender, religion, or class) within their boundaries.”106 Although racial
discrimination was not a solely Southern practice—African Americans in
Northern states experienced discrimination in housing, education,
employment, and economic settings107—in the South, racial restrictions were
omnipresent and ingrained in Southern life.108 One historian argues that Jim
Crow “was a Southern phenomenon, the infrastructure white Southerners
built to preserve, insofar as humanly possible, the old master/slave
system.”109
Jim Crow penetrated every facet of life for Southern African Americans:
it was an integral part of the social, political, and legal fabric of Southern
society.110 Jim Crow established restrictions on marriage,111 voting,112
HOLLOWAY, supra note 23; KIMBERLEY JOHNSON, REFORMING JIM CROW: SOUTHERN POLITICS
AND STATE IN THE AGE BEFORE BROWN (2010); STETSON KENNEDY, JIM CROW GUIDE: THE
WAY IT WAS (Fl. Atl. Univ. Press 1990) (1959); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO
CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004); PAULI
MURRAY, STATES’ LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR (1950); REMEMBERING JIM CROW: AFRICAN
AMERICANS TELL ABOUT LIFE IN THE SEGREGATED SOUTH (William H. Chafe et al. eds., 2001);
THE FOLLY OF JIM CROW: RETHINKING THE SEGREGATED SOUTH (Stephanie Cole & Natalie J.
Ring eds., 2012); LESLIE V. TISCHAUSER, JIM CROW LAWS (2012); WOODWARD, supra note
104; RICHARD WORMSER, THE RISE AND FALL OF JIM CROW (2003); Stephen Ansolabehere &
Samuel Issacharoff, The Story of Baker v. Carr, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 271
(Michael C. Dorf ed., 2d ed. 2009); Cheryl I. Harris, The Story of Plessy v. Ferguson: The
Death and Resurrection of Racial Formalism, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES, supra at 187.
106. TISCHAUSER, supra note 105, at 1. For an overview of state laws on race during the
Jim Crow era, see generally MURRAY, supra note 105.
107. PACKARD, supra note 105, at 64.
108. See, e.g., MURRAY, supra note 105, at 21–34, 38–50, 77–117, 164–95, 198–211, 237–
50, 329–48, 406–22, 427–56, 461–90 (detailing state laws on race in effect during the Jim
Crow era in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia); PACKARD,
supra note 105, at 62–65; TISCHAUSER, supra note 105, at 35–37; see also THOMAS PEARCE
BAILEY, RACE ORTHODOXY IN THE SOUTH AND OTHER ASPECTS OF THE NEGRO QUESTION 92–
93 (1914) (describing “the racial creed of the Southern people”).
109. PACKARD, supra note 105, at 64.
110. Id. at 64–65.
111. See KENNEDY, supra note 105, at 63–71; TISCHAUSER, supra note 105, at 150–51;
James R. Browning, Anti-Miscegenation Laws in the United States, 1 DUKE B.J. 26, 31 (1951);
Paul A. Lombardo, Miscegenation, Eugenics, and Racism: Historical Footnotes to Loving v.
Virginia, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 421, 425–26 & n.18 (1988) (discussing judicial decisions
supporting antimiscegenation laws); see also Loving v. Commonwealth, 147 S.E.2d 78, 83
(Va. 1966) (upholding Virginia’s antimiscegenation statute). But see Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely because
of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.”).
112. See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 105, at 147–64; KLARMAN, supra note 105, at 28–39;
TISCHAUSER, supra note 105, at 47–50; Ansolabehere & Issacharoff, supra note 105, at 297;
see also Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 225 (1898) (concluding that state
constitutional requirements of poll taxes and literacy for voting did not discriminate based on
race). But see Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (“We conclude that a
State violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes
the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard. . . . [T]he Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment restrains the States from fixing voter
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education,113 employment,114 housing,115 travel,116 and enforced segregation
in public spaces.117 Some of these restrictions were codified in law, and
others were ingrained as a matter of social behavior and custom.118 Jim Crow
“stood for an entire culture based on violence, racism, and fear that affected
the life of every African American living in the South.”119 Despite the
passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, Supreme
Court precedent in the wake of those amendments upheld laws that enforced
racial inequality through segregation laws, or laws that created a
disproportionately discriminatory impact on African Americans.120
Racial classification was an integral part of Jim Crow.121 The majority of
the Southern states legalized racial classification by codifying the “one-drop”
rule or enshrining it as part of their state constitutions: any modicum of black
ancestry meant that the individual in question was not white, and thus subject

qualifications which invidiously discriminate.”); Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145,
154–56 (1965) (finding that state constitutional provisions that require voters to satisfy voting
registrars that they understand and can interpret the U.S. or Louisiana constitutions violate the
Constitution and are inconsistent with prohibitions against race-based voting discrimination
under the Fifteenth Amendment); United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 151 (1965)
(concluding that the attorney general has the power to sue a state and state officials to protect
voting rights of African American citizens).
113. See KENNEDY, supra note 105, at 86–108; TISCHAUSER, supra note 105, at 38–46,
116–17 (discussing the impact of Jim Crow policies in education). But see Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that segregation of public educational facilities
results in deprivation of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment and that
“[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal”); McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents,
339 U.S. 637, 642 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634–35 (1950).
114. See KENNEDY, supra note 105, at 109–30.
115. See TISCHAUSER, supra note 105, at 68–69 (“Some towns excluded all people of color
from residing anywhere within their boundaries, or, in the case of ‘sundown towns,’ had laws
making it a crime for people of color to be found within city limits after 8:00 p.m.”). But cf.
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948).
116. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551–52 (1896), overruled by Brown, 347 U.S.
483; KENNEDY, supra note 105, at 178–89; A. K. Sandoval-Strausz, Travelers, Strangers, and
Jim Crow: Law, Public Accommodations, and Civil Rights in America, 23 L. & HIST. REV.
53, 54 (2005); see also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964).
117. See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 105, at 190–202; TISCHAUSER, supra note 105, at 68
(“By 1920, Southern state legislatures and governors had passed more than 350 segregation
laws . . . [that] separated people by race in cemeteries, churches, hospitals, labor unions,
prisons, offices, factories, mines, parks, public buildings, railway trains, railway station
waiting rooms, housing developments, neighborhoods, schools, stores, streetcars, theaters,
funeral parlors, and any other places people could meet.”); Harris, supra note 105, at 187. See
generally PACKARD, supra note 105.
118. See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 105, at 203–27 (discussing “[t]he [d]ictates of [r]acist
[e]tiquette”). See generally REMEMBERING JIM CROW, supra note 105.
119. See TISCHAUSER, supra note 105, at 2.
120. See, e.g., Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 222–25 (1898); Plessy, 163 U.S. at
544; The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25–26 (1883).
121. See IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 81–86
(rev. ed. 2006) (discussing segregation era laws and arguing that law “constructs racial
differences on several levels through the promulgation and enforcement of rules that determine
permissible behavior”); PACKARD, supra note 105, at 94–100 (discussing racial definitions and
state laws identifying which citizens were not considered white); Gross, supra note 104, at
177–78; Jones, supra note 61, at 1487, 1495–96 & nn.25–26; see also infra note 122.
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to Jim Crow laws.122 Definitions of race were also included in
antimiscegenation laws, which prohibited interracial marriage.123 Virginia,
for example, adopted a law that required racial descriptions to be recorded at
a child’s birth to further classify individuals as “white” or “colored.”124
Virginia’s Racial Integrity Act of 1924125 “required all citizens within the
state born after June 14, 1912 to register their racial composition with the
Bureau of Vital Statistics,”126 prohibited interracial marriages, and defined
who exactly qualified as “white.”127 A copy of an old birth record form
provided by the Library of Virginia describes the definition of “white” under
Virginia law: “A white person is one with no trace whatever of blood of
another race, except that one with one-sixteenth of the blood of American
Indian, unmixed with other race, may be classed as white.”128
Thus, the Jim Crow system depended on initial classification and markers
of racial identity to determine who would be subjected to laws that designated
individual treatment, rights, and privileges based on those classifications.129
B. Classification and Screening
Classification of identity, such as the race-based types that occurred during
the Jim Crow era, is an essential step in establishing exclusionary systems.130
122. See, e.g., OKLA. CONST. of 1907, art. XXIII, § 11; ALA. CODE tit. 1, § 2 (1940); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 41-808 (1947); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1.01 (1941); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 79-103, 53312 (1935); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 25 (1934); TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 2900 (1947); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. art. 493, art. 1661, § 2 (1947); VA. CODE ANN. § 1-14 (1950); Asher v. Huffman,
174 S.W.2d 424, 425 (Ky. 1943) (interpreting the Kentucky Constitution to define white and
colored children); Lee v. New Orleans Great N. R.R., 51 So. 182, 183 (La. 1910) (defining
“colored persons”); Moreau v. Grandich, 75 So. 434, 435 (Miss. 1917) (construing provisions
of the Mississippi Constitution to define a “colored” person); see also LÓPEZ, supra note 121,
at 83; PACKARD, supra note 105, at 98; Jones, supra note 61, at 1503–11. See generally
MURRAY, supra note 105 (providing an overview of the antidiscrimination and segregation
laws of the fifty states); Christine B. Hickman, The Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial
Categories, African Americans, and the U.S. Census, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1161 (1997); Daniel J.
Sharfstein, Crossing the Color Line: Racial Migration and the One-Drop Rule, 1600–1860,
91 MINN. L. REV. 592 (2007).
123. See, e.g., N.C. CONST. of 1875, art. XIV, § 8 (prohibiting interracial marriage,
including a “person of Negro descent to the third generation”); MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 445
(1939) (prohibiting interracial marriages as well as marriages to descendants of certain races
“to the third generation”).
124. See An Act to Preserve Racial Integrity, ch. 371, § 5, 1924 Va. Acts 534, 535 (repealed
1975), invalidated in part by Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); see also Richard B.
Sherman, “The Last Stand”: The Fight for Racial Integrity in Virginia in the 1920s, 54 J.
SOUTHERN HIST. 69, 70–71 (1988).
125. An Act to Preserve Racial Integrity § 5.
126. Kevin Noble Maillard, The Pocahontas Exception: The Exemption of American
Indian Ancestry from Racial Purity Law, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 351, 369 (2007).
127. Id. at 369–70.
128. Registration of Birth and Color, 1924, EDUC. @ LIBR. VA.,
http://edu.lva.virginia.gov/online_classroom/shaping_the_constitution/doc/birth_registration
[https://perma.cc/CSV7-EDX4] (last visited Oct. 16, 2017) (making available Form 59-3-1724-65M, titled “Registration of Birth and Color–Virginia”).
129. See, e.g., PACKARD, supra note 105, at 94–100.
130. See, e.g., Kitty Calavita, The Paradoxes of Race, Class, Identity, and “Passing”:
Enforcing the Chinese Exclusion Acts, 1882–1910, 25 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 26 (2000);
Andrew M. Carlon, Racial Adjudication, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1151, 1169–70; Jones, supra note
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Exclusion involves separating out individuals from a group or one group
from another category. It is not possible to exclude a group from a system of
rights and privileges without first determining criteria for exclusion.131
Therefore, classification is necessary for these systems’ operation.132 During
the Jim Crow era, these classifications took the form of “one-drop” laws, or
legal decisions that identified who was “colored” and who was not.133 Other
exclusionary systems have engaged in similar forms of classification. For
example, Apartheid in South Africa relied on national identity cards that
identified individuals by racial groups.134 During the Belgian colonial period
in Rwanda, officials mandated “Hutu” and “Tutsi” markers on identity cards
in a system that privileged Tutsi individuals and ultimately laid the
groundwork for the 1994 genocide.135 In Nazi Germany, the Nuremburg
laws determined who was Jewish and thus subject to exclusion,
discrimination, and persecution.136
Classification alone, however, is not sufficient to operate an exclusionary
system. Implementing such a system requires screening: determining
whether individuals who have been classified are complying with the rules
that accompany such classification or whether the individuals are somehow
“suspect.” Under Jim Crow, for example, screening was both official—such
as official segregation policy enforcement—and unofficial, as a part of social

61, at 1495–97. David Lyon points out that classification (or categorization) is also an
essential part of “[a]ll modern social institutions.” David Lyon, Surveillance as Social Sorting:
Computer Codes and Mobile Bodies, in SURVEILLANCE AS SOCIAL SORTING: PRIVACY, RISK,
AND DIGITAL DISCRIMINATION 13, 21 (David Lyon ed., 2003).
131. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Becoming Lawyers in the Shadow of Brown, 40
WASHBURN L.J. 1, 10–11 (2000); Calavita, supra note 130, at 10–11, 15–17, 20–23;
Christopher A. Ford, Administering Identity: The Determination of “Race” in RaceConscious Law, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1231, 1274–75 (1994). For a discussion of what constitutes
a government racial classification, see generally Stephen Menendian, What Constitutes a
“Racial Classification?”: Equal Protection Doctrine Scrutinized, 24 TEMP. POL. & C.R.L.
REV. 81 (2014).
132. See, e.g., Jim Fussell, Prevent Genocide Int’l, Presentation to the Seminar Series of
the Yale University Genocide Studies Program (Nov. 15, 2001), http://genocidewatch.org/
images/AboutGen_Group_Classification_on_National_ID_Cards.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TN5V-TJLC].
133. See supra notes 121–28 and accompanying text; see also Ford, supra note 131, at
1274–75.
134. See, e.g., Keith Breckenridge, Verwoerd’s Bureau of Proof: Total Information in the
Making of Apartheid, 59 HIST. WORKSHOP J. 83, 90 (2005); Carlon, supra note 130, at 1170;
Ford, supra note 131, at 1276–79; Paul N. Edwards & Gabrielle Hecht, History and the
Technopolitics of Identity: The Case of Apartheid South Africa, 36 J. S. AFR. STUD. 619, 625–
28 (2010).
135. See, e.g., PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL
BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA 55–58 (1998); Fussell, supra note
132, at 1; Helen M. Hintjens, When Identity Becomes a Knife: Reflecting on the Genocide in
Rwanda, 1 ETHNICITIES 25, 30–31 (2001).
136. MARION A. KAPLAN, BETWEEN DIGNITY AND DESPAIR: JEWISH LIFE IN NAZI GERMANY
77–79 (1999); David Bankier, Hitler and the Policy-Making Process on the Jewish Question,
3 HOLOCAUST & GENOCIDE STUD. 1, 14 (1988); Fussell, supra note 132, at 1. Scholarship has
linked the Nuremburg laws to Jim Crow laws from the American South. See JAMES Q.
WHITMAN, HITLER’S AMERICAN MODEL: THE UNITED STATES AND THE MAKING OF NAZI RACE
LAW 103–04 (2017).
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and behavioral norms.137 Jim Crow-era screening was a “small data” world
screening system, relying first on classification on paper documents, such as
birth certificates or identity cards, or an examination of physical
appearance,138 followed by screening to ensure that the excluded individuals
complied with the systems of classification.139 In a big data world, systems
of screening, such as the extreme vetting requirements of Trump’s Executive
Orders, are capable of surveilling vast numbers of individuals based on data
or other broad categories and then subsequently classifying them based on
status.140 Essentially, screening is now theoretically “equal” and the
classification system is “separate.”
Failing to examine the underlying bases of classification and screening
systems indicates an inherent level of trust in government systems that
ultimately may lead to harmful consequences.141 Screening in a big data
world serves as a form of technological interrogation and entrenches
surveillance as a norm.142 Mass screenings of citizens in “collect it all”
systems embed the structure of policing into the state in much the same way
that Jim Crow embedded racial classifications and screenings of individuals
based on race or perceived race.143 Big data systems seek suspicious data as
a means of identifying and classifying suspicious persons.144 Broad
population-based screening and mass surveillance promote fundamentally
undemocratic surveillance norms.145 As Justice Sotomayor explained in her

137. See supra notes 104–20 and accompanying text.
138. See Ford, supra note 131, at 1275; Jones, supra note 61, at 1496 n.26; supra notes
121–24 and accompanying text.
139. Ford, supra note 131, at 1275–76; Harris, supra note 105, at 187–90; Jones, supra
note 61, at 1496 n.26.
140. See supra Part I.A; see also Lyon, supra note 130, at 13 (“Abstract data, now including
video, biometric, and genetic as well as computerized administrative files, are manipulated to
produce profiles and risk categories in a liquid, networked system. The point is to plan,
predict, and prevent by classifying and assessing those profiles and risks.”).
141. See, e.g., David Lyon, James B. Rule & Etienne Combet, Identity Cards: Social
Sorting by Database, OXFORD INTERNET INST. INTERNET ISSUE, Nov. 2004, at 2; Daniel J.
Steinbock, National Identity Cards: Fourth and Fifth Amendment Issues, 56 FLA. L. REV. 697,
699 (2004).
142. Lyon, supra note 130, at 21 (“The individualization of risk thus fosters ever-spiraling
levels of surveillance, implying that automated categorization occurs with increasing
frequency.”).
143. See supra notes 121–28 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., Margaret Hu, From the National Surveillance State to the Cybersurveillance
State, 13 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. (forthcoming 2017); Jeremy Scahill & Glenn Greenwald,
The NSA’s Secret Role in the U.S. Assassination Program, INTERCEPT (Feb. 10, 2014, 12:03
AM), https://theintercept.com/2014/02/10/the-nsas-secret-role/ [https://perma.cc/Z32Z4TZ6].
145. See, e.g., Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070–71 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting);
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 456–67 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v.
White, 401 U.S. 745, 792–93 (1971) (White, J., dissenting); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 630 (1886); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN.
L. REV. 349, 403 (1974); Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State,
93 MINN. L. REV. 1, 17–18 (2008); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of
Constitutional Change: From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 490 (2006); Christopher Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, Political
Process Theory, and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 102 GEO. L.J. 1721, 1775–76 (2014);
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dissenting opinion in Utah v. Strieff,146 random, suspicionless identity
verifications by law enforcement on the street are inherently undemocratic:
[T]his case tells everyone, white and black, guilty and innocent, that an
officer can verify your legal status at any time. It says that your body is
subject to invasion while courts excuse the violation of your rights. It
implies that you are not a citizen of a democracy, but the subject of a
carceral state, just waiting to be cataloged.147

Further, some screening protocols may rely on rationales that are facially
neutral but ultimately based on impermissible classifications. In his
concurring opinion in International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump,148
Judge James Wynn pointed out that discrimination, even when “shrouded in
layers of legality[,] is no less an insult to our Constitution than naked
invidious discrimination.”149 Judge Wynn cited Dred Scott v. Sandford150
and Korematsu v. United States151 as examples of judicial failures in response
to exclusionary and discriminatory systems cloaked in legality.152 In the
majority opinion, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs had
sufficiently alleged that nationality served as a proxy for religious
discrimination153 and was a crude and ineffective measure for determining
whether a threat existed.154 Indeed, in her decision to refuse to defend the
first Executive Order, then-acting Attorney General Sally Yates considered
that it bore a resemblance to Jim Crow laws.155
Thus, systems of subordination, such as Jim Crow and Apartheid, depend
on classifying who is privileged and who is not. As discussed above, once a
classification is emplaced, laws can require separation, subordination, and
screening on the basis of that classification. Jim Crow regimes used racebased classifications to engage in a broad range of economic, social, and
The act of excluding or
political exclusions under the law.156
disenfranchising on the basis of race often required legally mandated

Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right
to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 251 (2002).
146. 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016).
147. Id. at 2070–71 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Strieff addressed whether the discovery of
a valid arrest warrant was sufficiently attenuating such that evidence discovered during an
initially unconstitutional investigatory stop was admissible. Id. at 2059 (majority opinion).
148. 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017).
149. Id. at 612 (Wynn, J., concurring).
150. 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
151. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
152. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 612 (Wynn, J., concurring).
153. See id. at 591–92 (majority opinion) (discussing the evidence that “national security
is not the true reason for EO-2,” including statements made by Trump as a candidate,
statements made by his advisors after he assumed office, and the issuance of both the first and
second Executive Orders); see also id. at 613 (Wynn, J., concurring) (“[T]he Executive Order
here relies on national origin as a proxy for discrimination based on religious animus . . . .”).
154. See id. at 596 (majority opinion) (citing internal reports from the Department of
Homeland Security and an amicus brief from former national security officials that concluded
that nationality-based screening is an ineffective means of determining terroristic threat).
155. Lizza, supra note 65.
156. See supra Part II.B.
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screening processes157 as well as screening through social norms and
behavior control.158 These screening processes would often require
governments or their private delegates to screen individuals on the basis of
race, and any failure to do so would often carry legal consequences as well
as social penalties such as ostracization.159
C. Cyberarchitecture of Algorithmic Jim Crow
Perhaps the easiest way to understand how the Jim Crow regime is being
replicated in a big data world through Algorithmic Jim Crow is to consider
the following scenario: imagine substituting race-based classifications with
classifications of digitally derived suspiciousness. Rather than relying upon
a targeted class, such as race, national origin, gender, or religion, as a sole
basis for exclusion, big data allows for exclusion to be based on an
abstraction, such as digitally inferred or algorithmically anchored guilt or
suspicion.160 In addition, big data can aggregate protected classifications
with other collected data.161 For example, biometric screening that uses soft
biometric indicators, such as digital assessments of skin color and estimated
age extracted from a digital photo, can combine race data proxies with other
proxy variables to predict criminal or terroristic behavior (e.g., aggregating
passport number and digital photo with data analysis of web browsing
activity and social media presence).162 In addition, there are multiple
components to extreme vetting, including, but not limited to, biometric
identification,163 record linkage,164 information extraction,165 and predictive
In some circumstances, these technologies allow for
analytics.166
classification and then screening. In other circumstances, these technologies
allow for just the opposite: screening, then classification.
What is difficult to understand is how machine learning and artificial
intelligence can replace human judgment in the classification and screening
processes of Algorithmic Jim Crow regimes. In a small data world, Jim Crow
required a human to physically inspect the skin color of an individual to
determine the race of that individual (e.g., a physician attesting to the race of
an individual on a birth certificate).167 In the small data world, screening
157. See supra Part II.B.
158. See supra Parts II.A–B.
159. See KENNEDY, supra note 105, at 206.
160. See, e.g., Margaret Hu, Big Data Blacklisting, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1735, 1759 (2015).
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., Shanti Gomatam & Michael D. Larsen, Record Linkage and
Counterterrorism, 17 CHANCE 1, 25–29 (2004).
163. See supra Introduction; see also VACCA, supra note 37, at 589 (stating that biometrics
is “[t]he science of automatic identification or identity verification of individuals using
physiological or behavioral characteristics”).
164. Michael D. Larsen, Record Linkage, Nondisclosure, Counterterrorism, and Statistics,
STAT. SOC. CAN. (May 2006), https://ssc.ca/sites/ssc/files/survey/documents/SSC2006_
Michael_Larsen.pdf [https://perma.cc/P3ZF-8URC] (explaining that record linkage seeks to
identify records that belong to the same individual).
165. Id.
166. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
167. See supra Part II.A.
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processes also required human judgment (e.g., a county clerk inspecting birth
certificates before issuing marriage licenses and marriage certificates to
determine compliance with antimiscegenation laws).168
In contrast, human involvement is not required to classify individuals in a
big data world. An individual can be classified as a potential criminal,
terrorist, or threat risk based on digital data alone and digitized analysis such
as algorithmic screening. Algorithmic tools can analyze data to establish
identity (e.g., a record-locator matching algorithm such as database screening
systems that match names with passport numbers and other databases of
personally identifiable information) and screen for suspicious digital profiles
(e.g., combine passport information with stored data and real time data).169
Stored data might include bulk telephony metadata170—databases that collect
time, duration, and geolocation of calls—and other government records and
private data, such as consumer activities.171 Real-time analytics can include
situational awareness systems that attempt to analyze real-time video
surveillance feeds that connect the monitored individual through facial
recognition technology to that individual’s social media.172
Hence, the nature of classification and screening capacities are radically
different in a big data world. Classification, therefore, can be based in part
or in whole on artificial intelligence. Similarly, screening in a big data world
does not rely on human processes. The No Fly List, for example, can be
generated through database screening and digital watchlisting systems rather
than human nomination.173 Thus, in a big data world, classification and
screening protocols can be combined, digitized, and automated. As a result,
these big data classification and screening systems may be nearly impossible
for a citizen to interrogate or challenge.174
What is similar between big data and small data exclusionary regimes is
that separation and segregation is at the heart of the processes. What appears
168. See supra Part II.A.
169. See, e.g., Gomatam & Larsen, supra note 162.
170. See, e.g, supra note 54 and accompanying text.
171. See generally Margaret Hu, Small Data Surveillance v. Big Data Cybersurveillance,
42 PEPP. L. REV. 773 (2015).
172. See Jonah Engel Bromwich et al., Police Use Surveillance Tool to Scan Social Media,
A.C.L.U. Says, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/12/
technology/aclu-facebook-twitter-instagram-geofeedia.html [https://perma.cc/C2TJ-NCWX];
Matthew Cagle, Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter Provided Data Access for a Surveillance
Product Marketed to Target Activists of Color, ACLU: FREE FUTURE (Oct. 11, 2016, 11:15
AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-future/facebook-instagram-and-twitter-provided-dataaccess-surveillance-product-marketed [https://perma.cc/7X44-WEPA]; Ally Marotti,
Chicago Police Used Geofeedia, the TweetDeck for Cops Under Fire from ACLU, CHI. TRIB.
(Oct. 13, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/bluesky/originals/ct-geofeedia-policesurveillance-reports-bsi-20161013-story.html [https://perma.cc/566Y-HBZK]; Nicole Ozer,
Police Use of Social Media Surveillance Software Is Escalating, and Activists Are in the
Digital Crosshairs, ACLU:
FREE FUTURE (Sept. 22, 2016, 2:45 PM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-future/police-use-social-media-surveillance-softwareescalating-and-activists-are-digital [https://perma.cc/NG4Y-GD33].
173. Hu, supra note 160, at 1761–62.
174. See generally United States v. Esquivel-Rios, 725 F.3d 1231 (10th Cir. 2013); Joshua
A.T. Fairfield & Erik Luna, Digital Innocence, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 981 (2014); Hu, supra
note 160.
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to be—at the earliest stages of the big data governance phenomenon—purely
national security motivated protocols, such as the No Fly List, might not
appear to be a part of a larger segregationist regime. At the earliest stages of
Jim Crow, separation of the races was deemed necessary by the Court in
Plessy v. Ferguson175 under security rationales to avoid race-based
conflict.176 At the earliest stages of Algorithmic Jim Crow, isolating
individuals based on data suspicions is also justified under security
rationales—to prevent terrorism.
Unlike historic Jim Crow, established to continue a racial hierarchy first
instituted through slavery, big data regimes do not overtly seek to create
subordinate social classes. But that may well be the result. Like under
historic Jim Crow regimes, security needs are professed as justification.
Even if we are not yet faced with a mature Algorithmic Jim Crow regime, it
is important to recognize that Jim Crow laws took decades to develop into a
pervasive legal system.177 With the benefit of hindsight, we now examine
the full arc of Jim Crow, including the opportunity to revisit the legal
precedent that allowed for segregation to take root and become
normalized.178 Jim Crow did not commence with the segregation of every
water fountain, swimming pool, bus, train, movie theater, hotel, or
restaurant.179 Jim Crow did, however, eventually convert nearly every
citizen into a race classification expert and screening specialist to comply
with the laws.180 Jim Crow laws imposed a duty under law or social norms
upon many entities—public, private, and individual citizens—to classify and
screen.181
How will classification and screening under Algorithmic Jim Crow, like
historic Jim Crow, require classification and screening requirements under
the law? How will Algorithmic Jim Crow impose a legal duty upon public,
private, and individual citizens to classify and screen? Jim Crow laws
mandated paper-based classifications such as attestation to racial
classifications on birth certificates.182 Big data technologies, however, do
not require discrete screening or classification procedures because of the
nature of modern data tools. Instead of separate processes that treat screening
and classification as separate, big data tools have the capacity to execute both
simultaneously.
In a small data world, linearity was more common between classification
and screening: the former had to follow the latter as a matter of logic.
Without racial classification, racial screening would not have been possible.
Once an individual had been classified as white, privileges under Jim Crow
logically followed that racial status. With big data, assessments can be made
175. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
176. Id. at 559.
177. See TISCHAUSER, supra note 105, at 1.
178. See supra Part II.A.
179. See supra Part II.A.
180. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
181. See supra Part II.A.
182. See supra note 128 and accompanying text (discussing Form 59-3-17-24-65M, titled
“Registration of Birth and Color–Virginia”).
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concurrently and, thus, consecutive processes are not necessary but may
occur. Under big data theories of identity management, an aggregation of
data can, for instance, map identity—such as classification of potential
terrorist status. In addition, the same vetting and screening protocols
facilitate determinations as to access (e.g., whether an individual can board a
plane or enter the country). It is the accumulation and analysis of the evergrowing aggregation of data that makes possible the database screening and
algorithmic decision-making that is at the core of the extreme vetting
enterprise.
New classification and screening technologies thus eliminate or reduce the
need to conduct human-based screening. Historic Jim Crow laws required
bus drivers to segregate passengers on the basis of race, a screening protocol
that required human judgment and human action.183 Contemporary systems
may use a combination of automated screening and human screening, such
as TSA screeners relying upon the predictive analytic systems of the No Fly
List.184 Algorithmic Jim Crow may also facilitate fully automated and
digitized screening systems.185
Under contemporary forms of big data governance, classification will
likely comprise a combination of traditional characteristics such as wellrecognized protected classifications (e.g., race, national origin, gender, and
age) as well as nonprotected attributes (e.g., data deemed suspicious, unstable
or anomalous digital data, and database screening and algorithmically
derived results) that allow for inferences of guilt. But instead of
impermissibly distributing or withholding privileges based on protected
classifications, big data will simply incorporate them as part of a “risk
assessment.” Such threat risk assessments will attempt to predict criminal or
terroristic predisposition.186 Unlike historic Jim Crow, Algorithmic Jim
Crow may not require classification in order to conduct screening. Because
of the vast amounts of digital data that can be analyzed for both classification
and screening purposes, data will, at times, be collected and sorted for
classification to screen.187 At other times, data will be collected and screened
183. See generally supra Parts II.A–B.
184. See Hu, supra note 160, at 1743.
185. Id. at 1746.
186. See infra note 227 and accompanying text; see also David Cole, The Difference
Prevention Makes: Regulating Preventive Justice, 9 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 501, 504 (2014);
Jennifer C. Daskal, Pre-Crime Restraints: The Explosion of Targeted, Noncustodial
Prevention, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 331 (2014).
187. Emerging facial recognition technology can capture digital photos and screen for “soft
biometrics” that include data relevant to the classification of protected individuals—such as
identifying ethnicity and skin color. See Noah Shachtman, Army Tracking Plan: Drones That
Never Forget a Face, WIRED (Sept. 28, 2011, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/
2011/09/drones-never-forget-a-face/ [https://perma.cc/8HLQ-TFJ4] (“The key [to more
advanced facial recognition technology] is a kind of digital stereotyping. Using a series of socalled ‘soft biometrics’—everything from age to gender to ‘ethnicity’ to ‘skin color’ to height
and weight—the system can keep track of targets ‘at ranges that are impossible to do with
facial recognition’ . . . .”); see also SIMONE BROWNE, DARK MATTERS: ON THE SURVEILLANCE
OF BLACKNESS 110 (2015) (“Digital epidermalization [through biometric recognition
technologies] is the exercise of power cast by the disembodied gaze of certain surveillance
technologies (for example, identity card readers and e-passport verification machines) that can
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to determine a classification. Thus, big data governance facilitates screening
and classification, or classification and screening, through big data systems
such as database screening, digital watchlisting, and security analytics.
Extreme vetting, as proposed in the March 6, 2017, Order and the
September 24, 2017, Order—and as promulgated by other immigrant
screening systems—is used in this Article as a mere example for how
Algorithmic Jim Crow regimes can potentially burrow into national security
policy-making. Directives such as the presidential Executive Order188 can
create classification and screening systems under law, regulation, and
policy.189 To understand how, it is important to dissect the manner in which
extreme vetting and other DHS algorithmically driven programs are likely to
classify and screen citizens and noncitizens.
Yet, a full explanation of how algorithmic classification and screening
systems work, and the problems presented by big data and predictive
analytics, is beyond the scope of this Article.190 There has been much
important work and attention addressing the broader topic, as well as the
issue of discrimination resulting from the use of these emerging
technologies.191 Predictive analytics make actionable or useful information
from data by using algorithms and other machine-learning techniques.192

be employed to do the work of alienating the subject by producing a truth about the racial body
and one’s identity (or identities) despite the subject’s claims.”).
188. See supra Part I.
189. Id.
190. Important scholarship and research is underway on the topics of algorithmic
governance, and algorithmic fairness and transparency. See generally Mike Ananny & Kate
Crawford, Seeing Without Knowing: Limitations of the Transparency Ideal and Its
Application to Algorithmic Accountability, NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y, Dec. 13, 2016; Omer Tene
& Jules Polonetsky, Taming the Golem: Challenges of Ethical Algorithmic Decision Making,
19 N.C. J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2981466
[https://perma.cc/HTN5-24SG]; Solon Barocas et al., Governing Algorithms: A Provocation
Piece (2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://edshare.soton.ac.uk/8849/31/48-GoverningAlgorithms.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9R9-N4HW]; Harry Surden, Values Embedded in Legal
Artificial Intelligence (Mar. 13, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=
2932333 [https://perma.cc/ZD8K-JA3G].
191. See generally CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION (2016) (providing
examples of discrimination from the use of predictive modeling in a variety of settings);
FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL
MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015); Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L.
REV. 1023 (2017); Tal Zarsky, Transparency in Data Mining: From Theory to Practice, in
DISCRIMINATION AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY: DATA MINING AND PROFILING
IN LARGE DATABASES 301 (Bart Custers et al. eds., 2013); Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable
Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633 (2017); Claire Cain Miller, Algorithms and Bias: Q. and
A. with Cynthia Dwork, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/
2015/08/11/upshot/algorithms-and-bias-q-and-a-with-cynthia-dwork.html
[https://perma.cc/93EH-9G5N] (“Cynthia Dwork, a computer scientist at Microsoft Research
in Silicon Valley . . . discussed how algorithms learn to discriminate, who’s responsible when
they do, and the trade-offs between fairness and privacy.”); Lauren Weber & Elizabeth
Dwoskin, Are Workplace Personality Tests Fair?, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 29, 2014),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/are-workplace-personality-tests-fair-1412044257
[https://perma.cc/3GUY-F7ZP].
192. Ravi Kalakota, Making Money on Predictive Analytics—Tools, Consulting and
Content, BUS. ANALYTICS 3.0 (Mar. 18, 2012), https://practicalanalytics.co/2012/03/18
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While algorithms and other machine-learning technologies can make
meaningful connections from large sets of data that are outside any human
capabilities, researchers and experts are increasingly noting their limitations:
artificial intelligence systems are not immune to inherent racial biases, and
thus judgments derived from algorithms may also be suspect.193
III. THEORETICAL EQUALITY UNDER ALGORITHMIC JIM CROW
Part III explores how modern vetting protocol is properly understood as
part of a web of identity-management technologies that may extend to the
entire citizenry. For example, although extreme vetting is presented as a
procedure that is restricted to refugees, immigrants, and foreign visitors
seeking a travel visa to the United States, this characterization is misleading.
Extreme vetting is better grasped as a function of database screening and
digital watchlisting systems that can be applied equally to all citizens and
noncitizens under a wide range of contexts, often justified by national and
homeland security policy rationales.
A. Limitations of Equal Protection as
a Legal Response to Algorithmic Jim Crow
Before they are allowed to fly, work, drive, or vote, citizens and
noncitizens alike can now be subjected to mass data collection and automated
or semiautomated database screening protocols.194 Increasingly, in the name
of national and homeland security, post-9/11 big data programs implemented
by the government allow for core rights and freedoms to be partially
obstructed in some instances or altogether blocked in others.195 Moreover,
because of the “virtual” nature of mass data collection and database screening
and the classified nature of certain programs, the digital mediation and
potential interference of liberty interests can occur without our knowledge or
consent.196
As the national population is increasingly represented in the growing
databases and becomes subject to potential across-the-board vetting and
screening, claims of equal protection violations may collapse. This

/making-money-on-predictive-analytics-tools-consulting-and-content/
[https://perma.cc/LBV3-N9BL].
193. See generally O’NEIL, supra note 191; DAVID ROBINSON ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS, BIG
DATA, AND OUR ALGORITHMIC FUTURE (2014); Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big
Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671 (2016); Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias,
ProPublica (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-riskassessments-in-criminal-sentencing [https://perma.cc/EM5U-ZNTA]; Miller, supra note 191.
194. See infra notes 327–33 and accompanying text.
195. See Big Data: Seizing Opportunities, Preserving Values, WHITE HOUSE 5 (2014),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/20150204_Big_Data_
Seizing_Opportunities_Preserving_Values_Memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9S9-S9HB].
196. See PASQUALE, supra note 191, at 101–03 (describing private credit scoring regimes
and computerization of the finance sector); Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The
Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2014)
(discussing algorithmic and scoring systems implemented by various individuals or companies
that use data to make decisions on characterizing a person in numerous aspects of society).
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likelihood increases as defenders of database screening argue such screening
minimizes the role of the human element and thus minimizes the risk of racial
profiling on a theoretical level. Because the algorithms of any given big data
vetting or database screening system will not be transparent to those subject
to screening, the denial of a benefit or privilege, or consequences such as
detainment and deportation, will be without apparent cause beyond the fact
that the database has determined that they should be targeted.197
Thus, Algorithmic Jim Crow demonstrates how Jim Crow regimes can
adapt and evolve through use of modern technology. In Michelle
Alexander’s seminal work, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the
Age of Colorblindness,198 the story of Jim Crow has transformed from one of
mass segregation and disenfranchisement regimes in the post-Reconstruction
era into mass incarceration regimes in the post-War on Drugs199 and the era
of mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines.200 Alexander posits that Jim
Crow should be evaluated as a constantly evolving process, not a historical
artifact.201 Redressing new forms of Jim Crow requires observing
innovations in law and policy that result in the entrenchment of inequities on
the basis of race and other sites of historic discrimination.202 As such,
Alexander warns that vigilance is needed to bear witness to an evolutionary
process of law and policy that can lead to new caste systems.203 This is
especially true in a modern era that may present the mechanism for the caste
as colorblind,204 and involve data tracking and digital sorting methods that
may present a “virtual” cage problem.205
Taking a cue from Alexander to refuse to limit Jim Crow to regimes
designed to subordinate a single race or class of individuals, we may see the
newest emergence of Jim Crow in mass surveillance and algorithm-driven
decision-making. Database screening and digital watchlisting systems, in
fact, can serve as complementary and facially colorblind supplements to mass
incarceration systems.206 The purported colorblindness of mandatory
sentencing and mass incarceration systems, for instance, parallels the

197. See Hu, supra note 160.
198. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS (rev. ed. 2012).
199. Id. at 47–58, 185–86.
200. Id. at 87–93.
201. See generally id.
202. Id. at 58.
203. Id. at 21 (“Any candid observer of American racial history must acknowledge that
racism is highly adaptable. The rules and reasons the political system employs to enforce
status relations of any kind, including racial hierarchy, evolve and change as they are
challenged.”).
204. Id. at 240–45.
205. Id. at 184 (“In the system of mass incarceration, a wide variety of laws, institutions,
and practices—ranging from racial profiling to biased sentencing policies, political
disenfranchisement, and legalized employment discrimination—trap African Americans in a
virtual (and literal) cage.”); see also Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321,
1328 (2008).
206. See BROWNE, supra note 187, at 110; Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and
Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327, 329 n.6 (2015).
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purported colorblindness of mandatory database screening and vetting
systems.
As Reva Siegel has theorized, anticlassification jurisprudence cannot
achieve the same aims as antisubordination or antibalkinization
jurisprudence.207 In contemporary equality cases considered before the
Supreme Court, Siegel observes: “The Justices who vote against affirmative
action and other race-conscious civil rights policies are said to reason from a
colorblind anticlassification principle, premised on the belief that the
Constitution protects individuals, not groups, and so bars all racial
classifications, except as a remedy for specific wrongdoing.”208 This judicial
predisposition to overturn programs that redress wrongs for suspect
classifications—even when the clear purpose of such programs is to assist
those historically harmed by such classifications—means that vetting and
screening protocols that do not overtly target such suspect classifications will
not present an equal protection problem. In other words, if the
“anticlassification principle” continues to dominate equal protection
jurisprudence, “race-neutral” and equally applied database screening and
digital watchlisting systems will not appear to be inconsistent with the
anticlassification premise of equality law. Therefore, such programs may
pass equal protection muster, even if they impose disparate consequences.209
Similarly, Jack Balkin provocatively asserts that the law of equality is
often, in fact, the law of inequality.210 Balkin argues that, historically and
paradoxically, the law of equality has been adaptive to enforce inequality.211
Balkin explains that the Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson acknowledged
that a multitude of social and economic inequities arise on the basis of
race.212 Nonetheless, Plessy ratified racial segregation after finding no equal
protection defect with Jim Crow institutions.213 The Court concluded that
207. Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of
Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1282 (2011) (contending that equality
law can and should strive toward “vindicating antibalkanization—rather than
colorblindness—values”).
208. Id. at 1281.
209. Id. at 1338–42 (explaining that disparate-impact theories of discrimination are more
currently and directly recognized by equality jurisprudence established under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964). See generally MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL
FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES (3d ed. 2015); Reva B. Siegel, Why Equal Protection No
Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV.
1111 (1997).
210. JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST
WORLD 139–73 (2011).
211. Id. at 163 (“The model of scrutiny rules declares unconstitutional a set of
delegitimated state practices of race discrimination that were associated with Jim Crow in the
South, but it does not abolish all forms of racial inequality or social stratification. Rather, the
model of scrutiny rules develops alongside new forms of racial and social stratification
produced in the post-civil rights era.”); see also Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of
the Law: How “Color Blindness” Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification,
88 CALIF. L. REV. 77, 83 (2000) (describing a process of “preservation-throughtransformation” whereby the law adapts to protect new forms of social stratification).
212. BALKIN, supra note 210, at 145–46 (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551–52
(1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
213. Id. at 144–46.
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the “separate but equal” principle upheld the equality guarantees required
under the Equal Protection Clause so long as the government provided a form
of theoretical equality on the back end of segregation.214 According to
Plessy, the separation of the races on the front end of state laws did not create
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause because the discrimination could
be redressed on the back end.215 The Plessy Court further concluded that
racial separation on the front end could serve important law-and-order goals,
such as increasing a state’s interest in ensuring safety and social order among
the different races.216
This legal reasoning is now widely discredited and, as noted, the Court
now has an antidiscrimination approach that strictly scrutinizes laws that
operate along such suspect classifications.217 Nevertheless, that approach too
is viewed as inadequate by constitutional law experts and as hindering efforts
to address unequal realities. In contrast to the theoretical equality guarantees
assured on the back end of sorting methods instituted under historic Jim Crow
regimes, at the dawn of the big data revolution we may be witnessing more
and more legal contexts in which all are equally subject to digitalized vetting
and database screening protocols but with results on the back end that raise
equal protection concerns. Equality law that demands that the government
provide equal treatment under the law on a theoretical level on the front end
therefore prohibits traditional Jim Crow institutions. But Siegel, Balkin, and
others caution that equality law cannot stop at a judicial inquiry that ensures
colorblindness on the front end since that risks turning a blind eye to the
disparate impacts that can result on the back end.218
As the government continues to acquire more big data tools to serve
governance goals, such as database screening systems and predictive
analytics that assess risk, equality law may find no constitutional problem
with replication in reverse form of the social inequality permitted under the
“separate but equal” principle. Under an emerging technologically enhanced
Jim Crow regime, mass surveillance and semiautomated or automated
algorithmic sorting methods will appear to be equally applied across entire
populations. The colorblind and anticlassification premises of vetting and
screening systems will comport with an “equal but separate” principle. These
systems, however, will potentially offer only theoretical equality on the front
end of newly emerging data surveillance and data-sorting methods.
Meanwhile, any disparate impacts on the back end will be hard to challenge
judicially because algorithmic decision-making can occur in ways that are
difficult to document.

214. Id. at 140.
215. Id. 144–48 (describing a “tripartite theory” of divided rights and equality that
recognized three categories: “civil, political, and social”). Plessy did not attempt to extend
political or social equality rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
216. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550–51.
217. See generally supra Part II.A.
218. See Primus, supra note 26, at 504–09.
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The evolution of constitutional protections is, thus, critically necessary in
what Balkin and Sanford Levinson term the “National Surveillance State.”219
In the National Surveillance State, the integration of bureaucratized and
normalized data collection and Information Society surveillance technologies
into day-to-day governance should be understood as a distinctive concern of
American constitutionalism: “One of the most important developments in
American constitutionalism is the gradual transformation of the United States
into a National Surveillance State.”220 Constitutional protections that once
were taken for granted in a small data world have proven robust in theory but
lacking in practical application.221 Often, it is not so much that our physical
personhood is threatened in the National Surveillance State, but as Daniel
Solove describes it, it is our “digital person” that has been placed at risk.222
The shift to the National Surveillance State and big data governance should
be understood as paradigmatic. Big data and algorithmic intelligence
technologies are disruptive and transformative in nature.223 Defined by their
predictive and correlative capacities, big data technologies are capable of
facilitating a new type of knowledge that some argue is akin to virtual reality
(e.g., probabilistic or algorithmic holograms).224
Thus, big data surveillance that transforms into normalized day-to-day
governance practices often poses harms that are more virtual than physical—
for instance, digitally derived suspicion harms rather than detention harms.225
As a result, big data-driven predictive-policing methods are void of
reasonable suspicion as once defined in a small data world.226 For example,
while in a small data world, reasonable suspicion is based on specific facts
or inferences regarding a specific individual’s involvement in criminal
activity. In a big data world, on the other hand, targeting of suspects can
proceed based on data that is associated with them as collected in a database
219. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 145, at 521. Balkin and Levinson define the
“National Surveillance State” as being “characterized by a significant increase in government
investments in technology and government bureaucracies devoted to promoting domestic
security and (as its name implies) gathering intelligence and surveillance using all of the
devices that the digital revolution allows.” Id. at 520–21; see also Balkin, supra note 145, at
3.
220. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 145, at 520.
221. Id. at 523.
222. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 1 (2004); see also JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF:
LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 1 (2012).
223. See generally KITCHIN, supra note 32; MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note
32; EVGENY MOROZOV, TO SAVE EVERYTHING, CLICK HERE: THE FOLLY OF TECHNOLOGICAL
SOLUTIONISM (2013); danah boyd & Kate Crawford, Critical Questions for Big Data:
Provocations for a Cultural, Technological, and Scholarly Phenomenon, 15 INFO. COMM. &
SOC’Y 662 (2012); Citron & Pasquale, supra note 196; Hu, supra note 171; Omer Tene &
Jules Polonetsky, Privacy in the Age of Big Data: A Time for Big Decisions, 64 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 63 (2012).
224. See Seth Fletcher, How to Think About Privacy: An Interview with Jason Lanier, SCI.
AM. (Nov. 1, 2013), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/lanier-interview-how-tothink-about-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/AJ5J-5MVT].
225. See Murphy, supra note 205, at 1358.
226. See Ferguson, supra note 206, at 336; Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing by Numbers: Big
Data and the Fourth Amendment, 89 WASH. L. REV. 35, 42–48, 56 (2014).
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and that fit particular profiles targeted by database searches. Small data
discrimination, consequently, can evolve into a form of big data
discrimination in a myriad of ways. For example, statistical guilt or
correlative evidence that support inferences of suspicion can be assigned
through “race-neutral” tools that screen entire populations “equally.”
B. No Fly List and Discrimination on the Back End of Vetting
and Database Screening Protocols
To further understand how Algorithmic Jim Crow works in practice in
across-the-board vetting, this Part examines the No Fly List, the birth of a
“precrime”227 vetting system that screens citizens and noncitizens in a
purportedly equal manner on the front end. De facto discrimination, for
instance, has been alleged in the disparate impact of the No Fly List, a system
that has been referred to as a “Flying While Muslim” program.228
Although discrimination may not occur on the front end of the vetting and
screening process of the No Fly List, plaintiffs challenging the No Fly List
allege that the program results in disparate consequences that
disproportionately impact those populations associated with terrorism, such
as military-age Muslim males229 or Muslims who may be swept into the No
Fly List database screening systems by virtue of intensified surveillance of
Muslim communities by the intelligence community.230 Examining the No
Fly List litigation shows that, in the absence of discrimination in front-end
enforcement techniques, back-end discrimination can emerge from the
supposedly neutral analytics of the digital watchlisting and database
screening system itself.
The No Fly List as well as other vetting and screening systems have
already faced multiple legal challenges. Federal courts have been asked to
address the new types of harms presented by digital watchlisting and database
screening in the National Surveillance State.231 Of the challenges to multiple
identity-management technologies that have reached the Supreme Court,
none have allowed for an equal protection claim. As Cass Sunstein explains,
“[t]he Equal Protection Clause is directed at the legality of classifications.
When a classification is challenged, the first question is whether it is drawn
on the basis of race or some other characteristic thought to call for
227. See Ian Kerr, Prediction, Pre-emption, Presumption: The Path of Law After the
Computational Turn, in PRIVACY, DUE PROCESS AND THE COMPUTATIONAL TURN: THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW MEETS THE PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY 91, 93 (Mireille Hildebrandt &
Katja de Vries eds., 2013); see also Cole, supra note 186, at 518; Daskal, supra note 186, at
328.
228. ‘Flying While Muslim’: Profiling Fears After Arabic Speaker Removed from Plane,
NPR (Apr. 20, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/04/20/475015239/flying-while-muslimprofiling-fears-after-arabic-speaker-removed-from-plane [https://perma.cc/K6CS-3DA3].
229. The plaintiffs in Latif v. Holder included many military-age Muslim males, many of
whom are U.S. citizens who served in the U.S. military. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint
at 1, Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 62 F. Supp. 3d 909 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (No. 3:0600545-WHA), 2006 WL 2330786.
230. Ibrahim was under surveillance by the FBI, allegedly because she was Muslim. See
Ibrahim, 62 F. Supp. 3d at 916–17, 929.
231. See generally Balkin & Levinson, supra note 145.
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‘heightened’ scrutiny.”232 If there is an impermissible classification, that
statute must survive the appropriate level of scrutiny. If there is no
classification, Sunstein explains, the inquiry proceeds to a second question:
Was the classification motivated by an ‘intention’ to treat some class
differently on the basis of race or, again, any other characteristic said to call
for heightened scrutiny? If the answer is affirmative, heightened scrutiny
must be applied; if negative, the statute must be upheld unless it is not
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.233

Under the vetting and screening protocols of the No Fly List, there is no
classification or characteristic that warrants “heightened” scrutiny. Further,
thus far, there is no evidence that the vetting and database screening protocol
is motivated by an “intention” to discriminate on the basis of an
impermissible classification. Because equal protection is not a viable option
to challenge the No Fly List—as the screening is applied in a purportedly
equal manner—the use or misuse of data-driven tools has been central to the
inquiry in the federal courts.
Specifically, No Fly List litigation has been primarily successful through
procedural due process claims, though many plaintiffs also originally raised
substantive due process claims.234 The due process challenge to the No Fly
List is relevant here because that challenge attacks the workings of the vetting
and screening processes, and, importantly, how identity-management
technology can lead to stigmatization and reputational harms, allegedly on
the basis of classification. For the purposes of this discussion, therefore, it is
helpful to concurrently examine the due process analysis of two similar No
Fly List cases, though acknowledgeable differences exist between them.
In both Ibrahim v. Department of Homeland Security235 and Latif v.
Holder,236 federal courts analyzed due process claims that the plaintiffs’
rights to travel were infringed upon by their inclusion on the No Fly List. In
Latif, the plaintiffs argued that the No Fly List burdens a protected liberty
interest237 without due process of law: namely, that their placement on the
No Fly List burdened their liberty interests in the freedom of travel,238 and
freedom from the false stigmatization and association with terrorists and

232. Cass R. Sunstein, Public Values, Private Interests, and the Equal Protection Clause,
1982 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 127; see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996);
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290–91 (1978); Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 686–87 (1973) (plurality opinion) (Brennan, J.); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1, 11 (1967); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); Bertrall L. Ross II & Su Li,
Measuring Political Power: Suspect Class Determinations and the Poor, 104 CALIF. L. REV.
323, 324–26 (2016) (discussing evolution of suspect classifications and more exacting judicial
levels of scrutiny for specific groups deemed protected under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment).
233. Sunstein, supra note 232, at 127–28.
234. See infra notes 235–40 and accompanying text.
235. 62 F. Supp. 3d 909 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
236. 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134 (D. Or. 2014).
237. Latif v. Holder, 686 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 2012).
238. The Supreme Court has recognized both a right to “freedom of movement” and a right
to international travel. See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125–26 (1958).

670

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

terroristic activities implicit in inclusion on the No Fly List.239 Similarly, the
plaintiff in Ibrahim alleged deprivations of her liberty and property interests
without due process of law.240
Once a protected liberty interest in either the travel or reputational interest
was established, in each case, the plaintiffs were required to satisfy the threepart due process test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge.241 Under Mathews,
the court weighs: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official
action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”242
For example, under the first Mathews factor in Latif, the plaintiffs
contended that protected liberty interests reside in freedom of travel and
movement, and in reputational concerns.243 Under the second factor, the
plaintiffs argued that the redress procedure inherently risks an unacceptably
high error rate because it does not allow plaintiffs, or other individuals placed
on the No Fly List, the opportunity to confront or rebut any evidence used in
determining the appropriateness of their placement on the list.244 In other
words, the vetting and screening protocol of the No Fly List allowed for
discrimination on the back end in that those singled out as potential threats
had no meaningful redress. Finally, regarding the third factor, although
national security is a significant government interest, the procedural
protections provided to plaintiffs were insufficient given the lack of notice
and “wholly ineffective” procedures of the protocol.245
The No Fly List due process challenges are necessary to challenge backend discrimination because there is no other way to interrogate the
classification mechanism used to assess threat risk or what data might be
deemed suspicious. In other words, there may be alleged commonalities
among those finding themselves on the No Fly List, such as being Muslim
American, Arab American, a citizen of a Muslim-majority country, or of
Middle Eastern descent. Because the government argues that the No Fly List
involves classified information—including database screening systems and
vetting protocols that make “predictive judgments”—there is no meaningful
way to interrogate how and why that characteristic predominates among
those selected by the algorithm or digital watchlisting technology.246

239. Complaint at 50–51, Latif, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134 (No. 10-CV-750-BR).
240. First Amended Complaint at 11–12, Ibrahim, 62 F. Supp. 3d 909 (No. C06-0545
WHA), 2006 WL 2330786.
241. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
242. See id. at 335.
243. Latif, 28 F. Supp. 3d at 1147–48.
244. Id. at 1152.
245. Id. at 1160–61.
246. See Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 18, Latif, 28 F. Supp. 3d
1134 (No. 3:10-cv-00750-BR), 2015 WL 11347548 (arguing that the No Fly List is designed
to make a “predictive judgment” of potential threats).
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The closest plaintiffs on the No Fly List have come to determining whether
and how they faced classification-based discrimination is through a
deconstruction of the digital watchlisting architecture and an analysis of the
databases that may be implicated in the vetting and screening protocols.247
The complaints and trial records appear to suggest that the No Fly List results
in a disparate impact.248 The algorithms and databases present themselves as
neutral, without bias. Thus, due process protection allows for some
interrogation of the vetting and database screening systems and its errors.
Human error can become unimpeachable truth but for legal challenges.
Database error risks a form of unimpeachable truth without a legal theory to
challenge it. What are the reasons for being wrongly placed on the No Fly
List? How does one prove discriminatory animus in vetting and screening
protocols? How does one establish algorithm-derived discrimination? The
No Fly List litigation shows that equal protection as a theory fails to shield
those suffering disparate treatment or de facto back-end discrimination under
the current framework for evaluating Fourteenth Amendment claims.
As in Plessy, Algorithmic Jim Crow may offer theoretical equality that
may thwart challenges under the Equal Protection Clause. As in Korematsu,
governmental action taken purportedly in defense of national security may
be viewed as legitimately containing risk and may not be construed as
targeting individuals on the basis of classification. Plessy and Korematsu
represent two discredited cases that are now considered a part of what
Richard Primus and other scholars refer to as the “anti-canon” of
constitutional law.249 Just as those challenging the constitutionality of
historic Jim Crow regimes in Plessy and Japanese internment in Korematsu
were unsuccessful, those challenging Algorithmic Jim Crow regimes may
face similar difficulties due to similar deficiencies in current jurisprudence.
IV. FUTURE OF ALGORITHMIC JIM CROW
To further illustrate how screening and vetting protocols can be extended
to the entire citizenry, Part IV examines how the Supreme Court has handled
challenges to multiple identity-management programs in recent years.
Parties in several cases are attempting to seek judicial review of government
identity-management programs and dataveillance technologies, programs
that are rapidly flourishing in both scope and number. The Supreme Court
has now had the opportunity to review multiple identity-management
247. See id.
248. Various plaintiffs have alleged in litigation that constitutional harms arise from big
data watchlisting and dataveillance or cybersurveillance targeting systems, including database
screening systems. See, e.g., Latif v. Holder, 686 F.3d 1122, 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting
that plaintiffs alleged due process violations in relation to the No Fly List); Afifi v. Lynch, 101
F. Supp. 3d 90, 95–96 (D.D.C. 2015) (noting that plaintiffs alleged Fourth Amendment
violations based on cybersurveillance GPS tracking).
249. Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243, 243
(1998); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Plessy v. Ferguson and the Anti-Canon, 39 PEPP. L. REV.
75, 75 (2011); J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 963, 984–95, 1014–19 (1998); Jamal Green, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379,
379 (2011).
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systems in NASA v. Nelson,250 Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting,251 and
Arizona v. United States.252 In each of these cases, however, the equal
protection consequences of the vetting protocols were not before the Supreme
Court.
A. Biometric Credentialing and
Vetting Protocols: NASA v. Nelson
Nelson253 involved a challenge to aspects of Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 12: Policy for a Common Identification Standard for
Federal Employees and Contractors (the “HSPD-12” program)254 in an effort
to limit the impact of this identity-management program on personal privacy
rights.255 HSPD-12 is a post-9/11 presidential directive promulgated by the
Bush administration to implement a biometric ID-credentialing and
background-check program for federal employees and federal contractors.
HSPD-12 and the litigation surrounding Nelson provide an opportunity to
examine the impact of identity-management technologies. It explores some
future implications of these technologies, including the possibility of
morality testing in civilian background tests, which was originally at issue in
the case.
Exploring the impact of such identity-management technologies, including
the possibility of morality testing, is also important given the stated purposes
for extreme vetting procedures set forth in President Trump’s Executive
Orders on immigration. The January 27, 2017, Order specifically states that
its purpose is to include an assessment of the ideological and constitutional
posture of immigrants through extreme vetting:
In order to protect Americans, the United States must ensure that those
admitted to this country do not bear hostile attitudes toward it and its
founding principles. The United States cannot, and should not, admit those
who do not support the Constitution, or those who would place violent
ideologies over American law.256

Although the March 6, 2017, Order does not include this language, the
screening and vetting requirements set forth in section 5 are more expansive
and ambiguous. For instance, instead of focusing on constitutional ideology,
section 5 casts a wide precrime net, stating that the screening and vetting
standards will analyze, for example, the “risk of causing harm.”257
250. 562 U.S. 134 (2011).
251. 563 U.S. 582 (2011).
252. 567 U.S. 387 (2012).
253. Nelson, 562 U.S. at 142 (challenging whether HSPD-12 that mandates standardized
credentialing for all federal employees and contractors violates a constitutional right to
privacy).
254. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12: Policy for a Common Identification
Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors, DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY (Aug. 19,
2015), http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc_1217616624097.shtm [https://perma.cc/7G8ABEZ6].
255. Nelson, 562 U.S. at 138.
256. January 27, 2017, Order, supra note 4, § 1.
257. March 6, 2017, Order, supra note 8, § 5(a).
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The September 24, 2017, Order increases the ambiguity of the screening
and vetting mandate even further. In section 1(a) of the September 24, 2017,
Order, it states that the purpose and policy of the Proclamation is “to protect
its citizens from terrorist attacks and other public-safety threats. Screening
and vetting protocols and procedures associated with visa adjudications and
other immigration processes play a critical role in implementing that
policy.”258
The September 24, 2017, Order does not define how threat risks will be
assessed, nor does it provide specific details on the “[s]creening and vetting
protocols and procedures” that are prescribed. However, in several sections,
including sections 1(b), 1(c)(i), and 1(d), the Order refers to the need to
implement “identity-management and information-sharing protocols and
procedures.”259
The opacity of these “protocols and procedures”
reemphasizes the ambiguity of the precrime mandate suggested by the
Orders. Nelson, therefore, is particularly relevant to understanding the
ambition of the Orders, as the HSPD-12 program that was challenged in
Nelson was intended to help implement “identity-management and
information-sharing protocols and procedures” after the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001.
In Nelson, NASA contractors argued that the background check required
by the HSPD-12 program violated a constitutional right to informational
privacy. The Court ruled against the NASA contractors, holding that the
background-check process that was challenged consisted of “reasonable,
employment-related inquiries that further the Government’s interests in
managing its internal operations.”260
The Supreme Court’s decision in Nelson was widely anticipated by privacy
experts and scholars. Over three decades have passed since the Court
“referred broadly to a constitutional privacy ‘interest in avoiding disclosure
of personal matters.’”261 When the Court granted certiorari, therefore, some
were hopeful that Nelson presented a ripe opportunity to reaffirm the role of
a constitutional right to information privacy in safeguarding private
individuals—here, privately employed scientist-contractors performing lowsecurity-risk research for NASA through a private university—from
unnecessarily overbroad disclosure requirements by the government and the
risks of inadvertent or malicious exposure of personal information that could
result from the government’s digitalized data collection procedures. As one
amicus brief filed in the case explained, “Constitutional privacy safeguards
are particularly important in this case because NASA’s failure to meet its

258. September 24, 2017, Order, supra note 13.
259. Id.
260. Nelson, 562 U.S. at 151.
261. Id. at 138 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977)); see also Nixon v.
Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977).
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obligations under the Privacy Act and the agency’s poor data security
practices pose substantial risks to the scientists’ personal information.”262
Given the significance of the case, especially in light of increasing public
concerns about suspicionless data mining by the government and recent wellpublicized cases of database compromise through hackers, some were
surprised when the Court issued its decision rather quickly and summarily,
fairly soon after oral argument. In a relatively brief opinion, the Supreme
Court “assume[d], without deciding, that the Constitution protects a privacy
right.”263 The Court then concluded that NASA’s background check, newly
implemented to bring the federal agency into compliance with HSPD-12, did
not violate a right to privacy, if one were to assume that such a right might
exist.264 The Court held that “[t]he Government’s interests as employer and
proprietor in managing its internal operations, combined with the protections
against public dissemination provided by the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a (2006 ed. and Supp. IV), satisfy any ‘interest in avoiding disclosure’
that may ‘arguably ha[ve] its roots in the Constitution.’”265
With its decision, the Supreme Court overturned a preliminary injunction
that had ordered the suspension of NASA’s background-check process after
the Ninth Circuit found aspects of the government’s questions to be in
violation of the scientists’ constitutional right to privacy.266 The Supreme
Court explained that the Ninth Circuit was in error because “[t]he questions
challenged by respondents are part of a standard employment background
check of the sort used by millions of private employers.”267 Yet, the
significance of this case is misstated and misunderstood when cast as a
simplistic battle over background-check protocol under the government’s
HSPD-12 program and whether that protocol may or may not implicate
constitutional privacy interests.
Both the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit focused on a series of drugrelated questions presumed to be the most objectionable to the scientists and
that are listed on the Standard Form 85: Questionnaire for Non-Sensitive
Positions (“SF 85”).268 SF 85 asks whether an employee has “used,
possessed, supplied, or manufactured illegal drugs” in the last year.269 In
issuing the preliminary injunction, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
form’s “‘open-ended and highly private’ questions . . . were not ‘narrowly
tailored’ to meet the Government’s interests in verifying contractors’

262. Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and Legal
Scholars and Technical Experts in Support of Respondents at 6, Nelson, 562 U.S. 134 (No.
09-530), 2010 WL 3167308.
263. Nelson, 562 U.S. at 138.
264. Id.
265. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599, 605).
266. Nelson v. NASA, 506 F.3d 713, 715–16 (9th Cir. 2007).
267. Nelson, 562 U.S. at 149.
268. Form: SF85, U.S. GEN. SERVICES ADMIN., https://www.gsa.gov/portal/forms/
download/116378 [https://perma.cc/4JHM-6ESJ].
269. Id.
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identities and ‘ensuring the security” of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory at
NASA.270
In a footnote, the Court noted a compelling question raised by the scientists
that had been dismissed by the Ninth Circuit as unripe and had not been made
the subject of a cross-petition: a question of the so-called “suitability” criteria
that the government used to determine employment eligibility at Jet
Propulsion Laboratory.271 These factors include consideration of a
candidate’s financial and emotional health as well as things like “carnal
knowledge.”272 The “suitability” criteria were derived from a ninety-fourpage government vetting protocol document titled, “NASA Desk Guide for
Suitability and Security Clearance Processing, Version 2.”273
Specifically, understanding the scientists’ constitutional informational
privacy claim requires an understanding of the morality- and charactertesting criteria that were open for questioning and evaluation during the
background-check process required under NASA’s implementation of
HSPD-12. On page sixty-five of the desk guide, NASA includes an “Issue
Characterization Chart” that allows NASA to assess individuals’ character
and “suitability” based on more than 100 itemized characteristics.274 These
items appeared to assess good moral character and trustworthiness.
Characteristics on the evaluation include: “[d]runk”; “[b]ad check”;
“[p]attern of irresponsibility as reflected in credit history”; “[c]arnal
knowledge”; “indecent proposal”; “sodomy”; “voyeurism [or] peeping tom”;
“[m]ailing, selling, or displaying obscene material”; “[b]eastiality”;
“[p]attern of excessive [substance abuse] as reflected in inability to function
responsibly [and] medical treatment or poor health”; “[d]isorderly conduct”;
“[a]ttitude [and] [p]ersonality [c]onflict”; “[t]respassing”; and “[m]inor
traffic violation.”275
Upon successful completion of the NASA “Suitability and Security
Clearance Processing” protocol, the desk guide authorizes the agency to issue
the NASA employee or private contractor a biometric ID card in accordance
with HSPD-12.276 Failure to pass this newly implemented clearance process
results in the termination of employment.277 While the “suitability” criteria
were not before the Court, the acting solicitor general nevertheless felt
compelled to assert at oral argument that “NASA will not and does not use”

270. Nelson, 562 U.S. at 143.
271. Id. at 143 n.5.
272. Id.; see also AGENCY HUM. RES. DIV., NAT’L AERONOTICS & SPACE ADMIN., SREF30000-0003, NASA DESK GUIDE FOR SUITABILITY AND SECURITY CLEARANCE PROCESSING
VERSION 2, at 51 (2008) [hereinafter NASA DESK GUIDE], http://hspd12jpl.org/files/Suitability
SecurityDeskGuide.pdf [https://perma.cc/957P-9PJN].
273. NASA DESK GUIDE, supra note 272, at 51.
274. Id. at 65.
275. See Nelson, 562 U.S. at 143 n.5; NASA DESK GUIDE, supra note 272, at 65–67. The
NASA Desk Guide provides this caveat: “[T]raffic violations not required to be admitted on
OF306 or other application material/QSP will not be considered issues.” NASA DESK GUIDE,
supra note 272, at 67.
276. NASA DESK GUIDE, supra note 272, at 71–93.
277. Id.
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such objectionable criteria “to make contractor credentialing decisions.”278
The need for such assurance indicates the scientists did indeed have real
privacy concerns, even if they did not crystallize into part of a live claim
before the Court.
Thus, lost in this case was a real concern about what information NASA,
or any other government agency, is allowed to seek under the identityverification procedures imposed by HSPD-12 and whether the constitution,
under a privacy right, imposes any fundamental limiting principles on that
identity-verification process. The acting solicitor general’s assurance that
intimate personal details regarding credit card debt and carnal knowledge, for
example, will not be considered by NASA is nothing more than that—just an
assurance. Meanwhile the “suitability” criteria that could be used to
determine the denial of the issuance of a biometric ID card under HSPD-12
makes clear that fears that government identity-management programs may
become overbroad and overintrusive are not paranoid or baseless.
Nelson, by affirming HSPD-12, may now pave the way for the
implementation of a biometric credentialing program and uniform biometricbased dataveillance program on a national scale. Nelson also demonstrates
how suitable character testing or morality testing can be built into modern
vetting protocols in civilian background checks, as the facts of the case
demonstrated that NASA employees and contractors were required to
demonstrate trustworthiness and good character before receipt of the
biometric identification card.
Under a universal biometric identification system, however, suitability
testing or character-vetting protocols could be embedded within the database
screening system itself. Thus, the morality testing would not necessarily
arrive at the front end of the vetting process, as was seen in Nelson. Rather,
the accumulation of biometric and biographic data enables both biometric
and suitability testing. Rather than clearing a suitability assessment in order
to qualify for a biometric ID card, a biometric-anchored database screening
system could allow for moral- and suitability-criteria testing on the back end
of the vetting process. Recent disclosures by Edward Snowden, for example,
explain how biometric data can be fused with biographic data to assess
risk.279
This development in Supreme Court jurisprudence is, thus, significant
because the original announcement of Trump’s “Muslim Ban” indicated that
the proposal was inclusive of U.S. citizens. Specifically, on December 8,
2015, shortly after then-candidate Trump announced plans for the Muslim

278. Nelson, 562 U.S. at 143 n.5.
279. See James Risen & Laura Poitras, N.S.A. Collecting Millions of Faces from Web
Images, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/01/us/nsa-collectingmillions-of-faces-from-web-images.html [https://perma.cc/PQD8-U5DN] (explaining that
biometric data can be combined with “two dozen data points” that include DHS databases and
other federal databases, such as “Transportation Security Administration No Fly List, [a
person’s] passport and visa status, known associates or suspected terrorist ties, and comments
made about [an individual] by informants to American intelligence agencies”).
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travel ban, he suggested in a nationally televised interview280 that the ban
could possibly extend to Muslim Americans.281 Trump invoked former
President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s World War II proclamation that U.S.
citizens who were potentially “enemy aliens” could be detained.282
On January 28, 2017, one day after President Trump signed the Executive
Order imposing restrictions on the travel and immigration of citizens of
Muslim-majority nations, Fox News asked former New York City Mayor
Rudy Giuliani whether the Executive Order was, in fact, a Muslim ban.283
Guiliani explained: “[W]hen [Trump] first announced it [during the
campaign], he said, ‘Muslim ban.’ He called me up. He said, ‘Put a
commission together. Show me the right way to do it legally.’”284 Giuliani
elaborated further: “And what we did was, we focused on, instead of religion,
danger . . . . Perfectly legal, perfectly sensible. And that’s what the ban is
based on. It’s not based on religion. It’s based on places where there are
[sic] substantial evidence that people are sending terrorists into our
country.”285 This suggests that discriminatory vetting and screening
protocols can evade judicial review if a protected class is targeted indirectly
through “race-neutral” criteria, such as threat risk assessments.
In Washington v. Trump,286 litigation that addressed the first Executive
Order, the Ninth Circuit disagreed that the government had established
sufficient evidence of an impending national security threat.287 On February
9, 2017, in upholding the Western District of Washington’s grant of a
temporary restraining order, halting the implementation of the Executive
Order, the Ninth Circuit concluded: “[T]he Government has not offered any
evidence or even an explanation of how the national security concerns that
justified those designations [of travel and immigration restrictions], which
triggered visa requirements, can be extrapolated to justify an urgent need for
the Executive Order to be immediately reinstated.”288
In subsequent litigation, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits agreed that the
Government had failed to show a sufficient justification for the Executive
Order. In Hawaii v. Trump,289 the Ninth Circuit panel explained that the
president had not made a “sufficient finding . . . that entry of the excluded
280. Christopher Snyder, Trump Doubles Down on Vow to Bar Muslims, FOX NEWS (Dec.
8, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/12/08/trump-calls-for-complete-shutdownon-muslims-entering-us.html [https://perma.cc/Q6ZF-8F96].
281. See Ali Vitali, At South Carolina Rally, Donald Trump Defiant on Muslim Ban, NBC
NEWS (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/south-carolina-rallytrump-defiant-steadfast-muslim-ban-n475951 [https://perma.cc/D3WC-5S56].
282. Snyder, supra note 280.
283. Amy B. Wang, Trump Asked for a ‘Muslim Ban,’ Giuliani Says—and Ordered a
Commission
to
Do
It
‘Legally,’
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
29,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/29/trump-asked-for-a-muslimban-giuliani-says-and-ordered-a-commission-to-do-it-legally/
[https://perma.cc/G7YYJG5A].
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
287. Id. at 1168.
288. Id. at 1168 n.7.
289. 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017).
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classes would be detrimental to . . . the United States.”290 In International
Refugee Assistance Project, the Fourth Circuit noted that while the
government argued that it had a national security purpose in issuing the
Order, evidence supporting such a purpose was “comparably weak[er]” than
then-candidate Trump’s statements about a Muslim ban, subsequent
statements on the issues, statements made by his advisors, as well as the
issuance of and statements made by President Trump and his advisors
regarding the second Executive Order.291 At the time this Article was
written, the Supreme Court had granted certiorari in both cases and
consolidated them for argument.292
On February 24, 2017, the Associated Press reported that a leaked memo
drafted at the request of the DHS acting Under Secretary for Intelligence and
Analysis concluded “citizenship is an unlikely indicator of terrorism threats
to the United States.”293 The memo states that the analysis undertaken by
DHS specifically analyzed the threat of the “seven countries [that were]
impacted by [section 3 of Executive Order] 13769.”294 The DHS memo
states that “of [eighty-two] people the government determined were inspired
by a foreign terrorist group to carry out or try to carry out an attack in the
United States [since the Syrian conflict commenced in March 2011], just over
half were U.S. citizens born in the United States.”295 The DHS memo further
states that the terrorists were from “[twenty-six] countries, led by Pakistan,
Somalia, Bangladesh, Cuba, Ethiopia, Iraq and Uzbekistan. Of these, only
Somalia and Iraq were among the seven nations included in the ban.”296 Both
the Ninth and Fourth Circuits discussed this memorandum and relied on it in
their rulings.297
Importantly, the original January 27, 2017, Order states that vetting policy
should include a test to assess fidelity to founding principles and the
Constitution.298 Statements by Trump suggest that such vetting should
290. Id. at 770, 775.
291. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 591–92 (4th Cir.), cert.
granted, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017) (“Plaintiffs also point to the comparably weak evidence that
EO-2 is meant to address national security interests, including the exclusion of national
security agencies from the decision-making process, the post hoc nature of the national
security rationale, and evidence from DHS that EO-2 would not operate to diminish the threat
of potential terrorist activity.”).
292. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2086 (2017). The author
reserves for future scholarship further inquiry into and analysis of the Supreme Court’s final
disposition and resolution of these matters.
293. Vivian Salama & Alicia A. Caldwell, DHS Report Disputes Threat from Banned
Nations, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 24, 2017), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/39f1f8e4ceed4
a30a4570f693291c866/dhs-intel-report-disputes-threat-posed-travel-ban-nations
[https://perma.cc/Z8NL-8VW6].
294. Memorandum from the Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Office of Intelligence and Analysis,
Citizenship Likely an Unreliable Indicator of Terrorist Threat to the United States (2017),
https://fas.org/irp/eprint/dhs-7countries.pdf [https://perma.cc/GKK4-TVG4].
295. Salama & Caldwell, supra note 293.
296. Id.
297. Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 759, 784 n.23 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. granted,
137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 575, 591–
92, 596 (4th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017).
298. January 27, 2017, Order, supra note 4, § 1.
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include a test to assess loyalty to the United States and whether an individual
will “support our country, and love deeply our people.”299 He further
promoted, as a candidate, the implementation of profiling and preventative
measures, such as mass surveillance, to assess terroristic risk.300
In Nelson, twin innovations in national security policy and biometric
surveillance policy included a machine-readable biometric ID card encoded
with digitalized biometric data and other personally identifiable data, as was
required by the HSPD-12 program. In the suitability criteria developed by
NASA, a version of extreme vetting emerged. The January 27, 2017, Order
discusses the need to implement loyalty tests that demonstrate “proAmerican” values. Thus, extreme vetting may be expanded to encompass
similar abstract assessments of character and morality as a part of threat risk
assessments.
By affirming the credentialing protocol surrounding HSPD-12 and
sanctioning an identity-management technology, Nelson opens the door to
profound questions of constitutional law, electronic privacy law and policy,
and surveillance policy that have yet to be resolved. These questions include
the role of biometric technology and dataveillance in national security policy
and immigration-control policy. It now remains to be seen whether HSPD-12
will eventually serve as a programmatic and technological prototype for a
national biometric ID system, such as a biometric social security card or
biometric ePassport, in the future.
B. Delegating Vetting and Database Screening Protocols
to States and Private Entities
In addition to de facto discrimination, Algorithmic Jim Crow regimes can
promote de jure discrimination or discrimination as a matter of law.301 Under
historic Jim Crow regimes, enforcement of segregationist laws was delegated
to both public and private entities.302 Those who participated in segregation
gatekeeping often did so under the threat of legally imposed sanctions.303
Resistance to the mandate to segregate train service, for instance, led to the
initiation of a legal challenge to Louisiana’s Jim Crow laws in Plessy, which
required the cooperation of railway companies that were frustrated with their

299. Michael D. Shear & Helene Cooper, Trump Bars Refugees and Citizens of 7 Muslim
Countries, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2017), www.nytimes.com/2017/01/27/us/politics/trumpsyrian-refugees.html [https://perma.cc/6UDJ-QCMR].
300. See Schultheis, supra note 99.
301. See Mack, Law, Society, Identity, supra note 104, at 394–95 (observing that de jure
discrimination reflected both a shift in law and social rhetoric).
302. See generally Sunstein, supra note 232.
303. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Martin Luther King, Walker v. City of
Birmingham, and the Letter from Birmingham Jail, 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 791, 796 (1993)
(“[S]hortly before King’s arrival the bus station manager had been jailed for permitting
African American passengers to use the white waiting room.”); see also TOM R. TYLER, WHY
PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 21 (1990) (“Social control refers specifically to altering citizens’
behavior by manipulating access to valued social resources or by delivering or threatening to
deliver sanctions.”).
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gatekeeping duties under the Separate Car Act.304 Railway companies
opposed the segregation law on the ground that running two train cars—one
for white passengers and one for black passengers—was economically costly,
especially for train routes on which ridership had proven to be light.305 The
petitioners also argued that it was unlawful to delegate segregationist
gatekeeping to the private companies who would be fined for allowing black
passengers to ride white railcars.306 Homer Adolph Plessy had been selected
to violate the Jim Crow law specifically because he was a light-skinned black
man who could “pass” as a white man.307
Yet, a similar de jure discrimination scheme may be emerging in the
modern era. How do private and state immigration gatekeepers determine
whether an individual is lawfully present in the United States? Under the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA),308 the federal
government delegated immigration enforcement authority to all employers,
public and private, to assist in immigration gatekeeping duties through the
examination of paper-based documents that purport to establish identity and
citizenship status.309 Under IRCA, employers faced civil and criminal fines
for failure to participate in sorting out undocumented immigrants from the
workforce.310
In 1990, the Wall Street Journal editorial pages compared federal
employer-sanctioning policies required under federal immigration law to
historic Jim Crow regimes. The publication explained that private entities
were once again asked to engage in discrimination311 under the law by
effectually being deputized as immigration gatekeepers. Specifically, the
Wall Street Journal described IRCA as “the first legislation since Jim Crow
where the government is so closely aligned with a process that produces
discrimination.”312
From the 1970s to the present, immigration laws at the federal and state
level have attempted to restrict immigrant access to transportation and travel,
employment, education, housing, and benefits.313 In contrast to historic Jim
304. Harris, supra note 105, at 187, 207 (citing 1890 La. Acts 111).
305. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 105, at 88.
306. Harris, supra note 105, at 212–13.
307. Id. at 212.
308. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
309. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a (2012).
310. Id.
311. Studies by the U.S. Government Accountability Office found that the employer
sanctions provision of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 had resulted in
widespread discrimination. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/T-GGD-9221, IRCA-RELATED DISCRIMINATION: ACTIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO ADDRESS IRCARELATED DISCRIMINATION, BUT MORE IS NEEDED 2 (1992), http://www.gao.gov/products/TGGD-92-21 [https://perma.cc/9UV4-7M45]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/TGGD-90-51, IRCA ANTI-DISCRIMINATION AMENDMENTS OF 1990, at 3 (1990),
http://www.gao.gov/products/T-GGD-90-51 [https://perma.cc/CU9N-8LYS].
312. Editorial, Clocking Immigration Sanctions, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 1990, at A12.
313. See Motomura, supra note 62, at 1361; Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry?:
Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV.
493, 513–14 & nn.106–10 (2001); see also Stephen Lee, Private Immigration Screening in the
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Crow regimes, however, the targeting of the undocumented immigrant
population does not need to proceed under a façade of “equality” because
such discrimination is often construed as legally permissible. Undocumented
immigrants, with important exceptions, do not enjoy the broad civil rights
protections and constitutional rights afforded to U.S. citizens.314 Even lawful
immigrants may face more restricted rights than U.S. citizens.315 Those
arguing in favor of tough immigration actions, including those defending the
Executive Orders, have explained this position as a legal defense of such
actions.316
Yet, for decades, lawful immigrants and those perceived to be foreign have
alleged that they suffer from a form of collateral discrimination: an
assumption of undocumented status and accidental targeting that stems from
restrictive immigration laws.317 Studies have consistently shown that vetting
and screening protocols required by immigration gatekeeping—sometimes
referred to as “show me your papers” laws—incentivize racial profiling.318
In other words, mandatory document checks often target those perceived to
be foreign: those who may be isolated on the basis of race, color, ethnicity,
national origin, religion, and “foreignness” characteristics,319 such as accent,
clothing, and a failure to present “whiteness” characteristics.320
In response to growing empirical evidence that immigration-related
screening and delegated gatekeeping duties by the government reliably led to
discrimination, Congress increasingly looked to technological screening
methods as “race-neutral” tools to achieve the same means.321 Throughout
the 1990s until the present, immigration reform legislation has proposed
database-driven methods to implement screening and gatekeeping

Workplace, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1130 (2009); Huyen Pham, The Private Enforcement of
Immigration Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 777, 780–81 (2008).
314. See Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural
Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1632 (1992). The
Supreme Court has recognized potential due process claims of persons in the United States
who are noncitizens including those present unlawfully. See Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128,
2133–34 (2015); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 692–95 (2001); Landon v. Plasencia, 459
U.S. 21, 33–34 (1982); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762–65 (1972).
315. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(3)(B) (2012) (restricting certain protections under the
antidiscrimination provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act to those immigrants with
lawful permanent residence status).
316. Reply in Support of Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Appeal at 5, Washington v.
Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (No. 17-35105), 2017 WL 492504.
317. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/T-GGD-90-51, IRCA ANTIDISCRIMINATION AMENDMENTS OF 1990, supra note 311, at 3.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.; see also Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1725
(1993).
321. See Basic Pilot Program Extension and Expansion Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-156,
117 Stat. 1944 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1324a (2012)) (authorizing the development of
the “basic pilot program for employment eligibility verification” to implement a
technologically improved method to screen immigrants).
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functions.322 Many of these database screening methods are experimental
and still under testing.323
Nonetheless, the 9/11 terror attacks accelerated the rollout of these
experimental vetting and screening systems.324 The immigrant status of the
9/11 hijackers led to calls for policy initiatives that could facilitate the
identification and more efficient tracking of immigrants and potential
terrorists through cybersurveillance and dataveillance technologies.325 Many
of these technologies were dependent upon biometric data monitoring and
database-facilitated algorithmic sorting tools.326 The impetus was not so
much to avoid bias in screening but to harness the supposed efficiencies and
reliability of a database-centered means of screening.
Since 9/11, immigration policy and national security policy have
increasingly converged. At the federal level, this convergence could be seen
in the increasing adoption of big data identity-management systems aimed to
screen the population to determine who could receive rights and benefits,
such as the No Fly List,327 the No Work List (“E-Verify”),328 and the No
322. See id.
323. Id. § 3(b)(b)(1) (“[E]valuating whether the problems identified by the report submitted
under subsection (a) have been substantially resolved . . . .”); id. § 3(b)(b)(2) (“[D]escribing
what actions the Secretary of Homeland Security shall take before undertaking the expansion
of the basic pilot program to all 50 States in accordance with section 401(c)(1), in order to
resolve any outstanding problems raised in the report filed under subsection (a).”).
324. See Press Release, Transp. Sec. Admin., TSA to Test New Passenger Pre-Screening
System (Aug. 26, 2004), http://www.tsa.gov/press/releases/2004/08/26/tsa-test-newpassenger-pre-screening-system
[https://perma.cc/8RRW-8L9P]
(describing
the
implementation of a post-9/11 passenger prescreening program that checks passengers’ names
against terrorist watchlists in an effort to improve the use of “no fly” lists).
325. The 9/11 Commission Report, for example, emphasized the need to incorporate
biometric data into identity-management tools and systems in order to augment border security
and national security objectives. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE
9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 385–92 (2004), http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/
911Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/RT32-JKEZ] (“Linking biometric passports to good data
systems and decision-making is a fundamental goal.”).
326. See SIMSON GARFINKEL, DATABASE NATION: THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 37–67 (2000); KELLY A. GATES, OUR BIOMETRIC FUTURE: FACIAL RECOGNITION
TECHNOLOGY AND THE CULTURE OF SURVEILLANCE 1–2 (2011) (“The suggestion that an
automated facial recognition system may have helped avert the September 11 terrorist attacks
was perhaps the most ambitious claim circulating about biometric identification technologies
in the aftermath of the catastrophe.”); ANIL K. JAIN ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO BIOMETRICS vii
(2011) (“[T]he deployment of biometric systems has been gaining momentum over the last
two decades in both public and private sectors. These developments have been fueled in part
by recent [post-9/11] government mandates stipulating the use of biometrics for ensuring
reliable delivery of various services.”). See generally JENNIFER LYNCH, FROM FINGERPRINTS
TO DNA: BIOMETRIC DATA COLLECTION IN U.S. IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES AND BEYOND
(2012); Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional Abyss:
Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407 (2012); Hu, supra note
52.
327. 49 U.S.C. § 44903 (2012); 49 C.F.R. pts. 1540, 1544, 1560 (2016).
328. E-Verify is a “test pilot” program jointly operated by DHS and the Social Security
Administration that enables employers to screen employees’ personally identifiable data (e.g.,
name, birth date, and Social Security number) through government databases over the internet
in order to “verify” the identity of the employee. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., DEP’T
E-VERIFY USER MANUAL FOR EMPLOYERS 1 (2014),
OF HOMELAND SEC.,
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/nativedocuments/E-Verify_Manual.pdf
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Citizenship List (managed by Secure Communities329 and the DHS’s
Prioritized Enforcement Program330). These database screening and digital
watchlisting systems purport to further crime control, immigration control,
and counterterrorism objectives. The E-Verify database has not only been
used to restrict employment opportunities, but it is alleged that landlords have
used the database to screen tenants and that school officials have used the
database to screen students.331 Similarly, the No Vote List (“SAVE”332 and
[https://perma.cc/DB3D-P3MQ]. E-Verify is referred to as the “Basic Pilot Program” in the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) and in
subsequent congressional action extending its funding. Id. at 77–78; see also Basic Pilot
Program Extension and Expansion Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-156, 117 Stat. 1944 (codified
at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1324a (2012)); Basic Pilot Extension Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-128,
115 Stat. 2407 (2002) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1324a). For a thorough discussion of EVerify and its legal implications, see generally Juliet P. Stumpf, Getting to Work: Why Nobody
Cares About E-Verify (And Why They Should), 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 381 (2012).
329. Secure Communities (“S-COMM”) is an interoperability program that facilitates data
sharing and database screening protocols between the FBI, DHS, and local law enforcement
agencies. Important scholarship has addressed multiple legal issues relating to S-COMM in
recent years. See, e.g., HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 79–83 (2014).
See generally Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Policing Immigration, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 87
(2013); Christopher N. Lasch, Rendition Resistance, 92 N.C. L. REV. 149 (2013); Thomas J.
Miles & Adam B. Cox, Does Immigration Enforcement Reduce Crime? Evidence from Secure
Communities, 57 J.L. & ECON. 937 (2014). DHS explains that S-COMM is justified by a
combination of authorities. See Memorandum from Riah Ramlogan, Deputy Principal Legal
Advisor, to Beth N. Gibson, Assistant Deputy Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec. (Oct. 2, 2010), http://uncoverthetruth.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/
01/Mandatory-in-2013-Memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/CW98-2Y9G]. The authorities relied
upon by DHS include: (1) 28 U.S.C. § 534(a)(1) and (4), which provides the FBI with
authority to share fingerprint data with ICE; (2) 8 U.S.C. § 1722, which mandates the
development of a data-sharing system that “enable(s) intelligence and law enforcement
agencies to determine the inadmissibility or deportability of an [undocumented immigrant]”;
and (3) 42 U.S.C. § 14616, which ratifies information or database sharing between federal and
state agencies. Id. at 4–6.
330. The DHS Prioritized Enforcement Program (PEP) was announced by DHS Secretary
Jeh Johnson on November 20, 2014, to replace the S-COMM program; however, it appears
that the database screening protocols of S-COMM will remain intact under PEP. See
Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Thomas S.
Winkowski, Acting Director, Immigr. & Customs Enf’t 2 (Nov. 20, 2014),
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_secure_communities.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SCL3-Z7YX]. On February 20, 2017, former DHS Secretary John Kelly
signed an implementation memo announcing that S-COMM would be reinstated and PEP
would be rescinded. See Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to Kevin
McAleenan, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Enforcement of the Immigration
Laws to Serve the National Interest (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/
files/publications/17_0220_S1_Enforcement-of-the-Immigration-Laws-to-Serve-theNational-Interest.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SJE-9RS2].
331. Stumpf, supra note 328, at 400 n.87 (citing MARC R. ROSENBLUM, EVERIFY:
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. 5, 7 (2011);
Mary D. Fan, Post-Racial Proxies: Resurgent State and Local Anti-“Alien” Laws and UnityRebuilding Frames for Antidiscrimination Values, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 905, 923–24, 935–36
(2011); Kati L. Griffith, Discovering ‘Immployment’ Law: The Constitutionality of Subfederal
Immigration Regulation at Work, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 389, 417, 424–26 (2011); Rigel
C. Oliveri, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Landlords, Latinos, Anti-Illegal Immigrant
Ordinances, and Housing Discrimination, 62 VAND. L. REV. 55, 116 (2009)).
332. In recent years, state election officials have used the Systematic Alien Verification for
Entitlements (SAVE) database screening protocol to conduct voter purges. See Fatma Marouf,
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“HAVA”333) has been used for voter purges and to restrict driver’s licenses
as well as access to welfare benefits.334
After 9/11, the federal government sought a sharp increase in personnel
who could conduct vetting and implement screening protocols to increase the
effectiveness of immigration gatekeeping.335 Thus, the federal government
also increasingly invited state and local law enforcement to participate in the
enforcement of federal immigration law under a “force multiplier” theory336
Under the expanded
of delegation of immigration gatekeeping.337
immigration gatekeeping mandates of DHS, state and local governments
were granted access to DHS database screening systems and invited to screen
arrestees through these systems.338 After 9/11, the federal government also
experimented with the merging of database screening protocols to eliminate
the separation between civil and criminal immigration database screening
protocols.339
Under immigration federalism and national security federalism, state laws
have increasingly captured post-9/11 identity-management technologies
introduced by DHS. Consequently, comparisons between historic Jim Crow
regimes and contemporary immigration enforcement regimes have
intensified in recent years. De jure discrimination has been alleged in state
laws that mandate vetting protocols and the delegation of vetting and
The Hunt for Noncitizen Voters, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 66, 66 (2012). For more information
on the SAVE database screening program, see DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT
ASSESSMENT FOR THE SYSTEMATIC ALIEN VERIFICATION FOR ENTITLEMENTS (SAVE) PROGRAM
12 (Aug. 26, 2011), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_uscis_save.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7976-2BYA].
333. 52 U.S.C. § 21083 (2012) (originally enacted as Help America Vote Act of 2002
(HAVA), Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002)). HAVA requires each state to
implement and maintain an electronic database of all registered voters. Id. HAVA also
requires states to verify the identity of the voter registration application through crosschecking the applicant’s driver’s license or last four digits of the applicant’s Social Security
number. Id. § 21083(a)(5)(A)(i). If the individual has neither number, the state is required to
assign a voter identification number to the applicant. Id. § 21083(a)(5)(A)(ii). Each state
election office is tasked with overseeing election rules and procedures for that state in the
implementation of HAVA. President Signs H.R. 3295, “Help America Vote Act of 2002,” SOC.
SEC. ADMIN. (Nov. 7, 2002), http://www.ssa.gov/legislation/legis_bulletin_110702.html
[https://perma.cc/5TFK-M4MM].
334. See SAVE Database—Issues with Obtaining SSN and Driver’s Licenses, NAFSA,
http://www.nafsa.org/findresources/Default.aspx?id=11154 [https://perma.cc/3ZPW-TDFZ]
(last visited Oct. 16, 2017).
335. See Jennifer M. Chacón, The Transformation of Immigration Federalism, 21 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 577, 589 (2012); Kobach, supra note 63, at 545; Christopher N. Lasch,
Preempting Immigration Detainer Enforcement Under Arizona v. United States, 3 WAKE
FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 281, 328 (2013).
336. See Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to Kevin McAleenan,
Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs and Border Prot. et al., Implementing the President’s Border
Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements Policies 4 (Feb. 20, 2017),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Implementing-thePresidents-Border-Security-Immigration-Enforcement-Improvement-Policies.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RX6G-GBTM].
337. Id.
338. See supra note 329 and accompanying text.
339. S-COMM involves both civil DHS immigration database screening and FBI criminal
record database screening simultaneously. See supra note 329 and accompanying text.
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screening responsibilities. Similar to the segregationist gatekeeping duties
that were delegated under historic Jim Crow regimes, restrictionist
immigration gatekeeping protocols under Algorithmic Jim Crow have been
criticized as promoting both de jure and de facto discrimination against
citizens and lawful immigrants that may be perceived to be foreign.340
Specifically, state laws have proposed that legal penalties and liabilities could
be incurred by employers, police, landlords, doctors, school officials, and
state benefits administrators who fail to conduct vetting and screening
protocols.
For instance, the Los Angeles Times invoked Jim Crow comparisons after
passage of Alabama House Bill 56, a state law that attempted to control
unwanted migration in part by delegating immigration screening to both
private and public entities.341 Wade Henderson, president of the Leadership
Conference on Civil and Human Rights, also drew a comparison. On June 9,
2011, the day Alabama House Bill 56 was signed into law, he remarked:
“[E]ven Bull Connor himself would be impressed,” referring to the famed
segregationist who served as Birmingham’s public safety commissioner
tasked with enforcing the city’s Jim Crow laws during the 1950s.342
Similarly, the governor of Arizona signed SB 1070 into law in 2013,
referred to as the “racial profiling” law and the “show me your papers
law.”343 Shortly thereafter, Reverend Lennox Yearwood of the Hip Hop
Caucus, wearing a “Boycott Arizona” cap, declared during an interview that
the Arizona immigration law is “our Jim Crow moment for the 21st
century.”344 He further stated, “We can’t have anyone being checked based
on the hue of their color . . . . We need to put our lives on the line [in
protest] . . . . We need to stand up.”345 Members of Congress likened the
Arizona law to Jim Crow and historic apartheid systems.346
In future comprehensive immigration reform proposals and in the
implementation of extreme vetting protocols—especially with the Supreme
Court in both Whiting and Arizona apparently endorsing a potential merger
between criminal and civil database screening protocols—it is possible that
340. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, A Case Study of Color-Blindness: The Racially Disparate
Impacts of Arizona’s S.B. 1070 and the Failure of Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 2 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 313, 319–20 (2012); Karla Mari McKanders, Immigration Enforcement and
the Fugitive Slave Acts: Exploring Their Similarities, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 921, 947 (2012).
341. Beason-Hammon Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, No. 2011-535 (2011)
(codified at ALA. CODE §§ 31-13-1 to 31-13-30, 32-6-9 (2017)).
342. Richard Fausset, Alabama Enacts Anti-Illegal-Immigration Law Described As
Nation’s Strictest, L.A. TIMES (June 10, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/10/
nation/la-na-alabama-immigration-20110610
[https://perma.cc/3Y6E-4Y3B]
(“‘This
draconian initiative signed into law this morning by Gov. Robert Bentley is so oppressive that
even Bull Connor himself would be impressed,’ said Wade Henderson, head of the Leadership
Conference on Civil and Human Rights . . . . ‘HB 56 is designed to do nothing more than
terrorize the state’s Latino community.’”).
343. Kasie Hunt, Dems: Ariz Law Like Jim Crow, Apartheid, POLITICO (Apr. 28, 2010),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0410/36503.html [https://perma.cc/6E8S-SW6E].
344. Michael McIntee, AZ Is Our Jim Crow Moment of 21st Century, YOUTUBE (July 24,
2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sAbTzyegrDU [https://perma.cc/L2MR-TKDZ].
345. Id.
346. Hunt, supra note 343.
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other public and private actors could be delegated counterterrorism
intelligence-gathering duties pursuant to immigration gatekeeping duties
under the “force multiplier” approach. In Whiting, the Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of delegating immigration database screening to private
employers through the passage of the Legal Arizona Workers Act
(LAWA).347 Under LAWA, employers in Arizona were not only documentinspecting immigration gatekeepers.348 LAWA also transformed public and
private employers into database screening gatekeepers through a legal
requirement that they run all new hires through the E-Verify identitymanagement system, which allows employers to screen employees through
various federal agency databases.349
Similarly, in Arizona, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
delegating immigration-database screening to state and local law
enforcement after the passage of Arizona’s SB 1070.350 Similar to LAWA,
state and local law enforcement were transformed into database screening
gatekeepers through a legal requirement that they run all arrestees and those
suspected of unlawful presence through S-COMM, an internet-based
database screening system that checks biometric data (scanned fingerprints)
against DHS and FBI databases.
For example, in addition to Arizona’s establishment of an employersanctioning regime in LAWA (holding private employers responsible), and a
police-sanctioning regime in SB 1070 (holding state and local law
enforcement responsible), the state proposed a landlord-sanctioning regime
in SB 1611,351 enacted a state-worker-sanctioning regime in HB 2008,352
proposed a hospital-worker-sanctioning regime in SB 1405,353 and proposed
and enacted a public-school-worker- or teacher-sanctioning regime in SB
1407354 and SB 1141.355
Each of Arizona’s proposed sanctioning regimes requires a screening or
vetting system because otherwise, the Arizona legislature has contended, it
347. See Legal Arizona Workers Act, ch. 279, 2007 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1312 (codified at
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2009, 23-211 to 23-214 (2008)).
348. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
349. See supra note 328 and accompanying text.
350. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 416 (2012). Section 2(B) of SB 1070, which
was slightly modified and later codified in the Arizona Revised Statutes, provides:
For any lawful stop, detention or arrest made by [an Arizona] law enforcement
official or a law enforcement agency . . . in the enforcement of any other law or
ordinance of a county, city or town or this state where reasonable suspicion exists
that the person is an alien and is unlawfully present in the United States, a reasonable
attempt shall be made, when practicable, to determine the immigration status of the
person, except if the determination may hinder or obstruct an investigation. Any
person who is arrested shall have the person’s immigration status determined before
the person is released.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051 (2012).
351. S.B. 1611, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011).
352. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 1–501, 1–502 (Supp. 2011).
353. S.B. 1405, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011).
354. S.B. 1407, 50th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011).
355. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15–802 (Supp. 2011).
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could not verify who among its residents is an unauthorized immigrant and
who is not. The identity-management technology often relied upon by the
state gatekeeping law involved an algorithm-based database screening
protocol, often supplemented by a paper-based inspection, to log personally
identifiable data into a preexisting vetting and database screening system
operated by DHS. Although not all of these measures passed, the
gatekeeping and screening aspects of Arizona’s proposed comprehensive
immigration reform strategy, as well as other state and local laws passed or
considered in recent years, has resulted in an unprecedented expansion of
document inspection and database-driven screening protocols.356
Arizona’s aggressive stance on restrictive immigration gatekeeping is
enabled by the introduction of big data vetting analytics and database
screening potentialities, often conducted through internet-based screening of
DHS and other federal agency databases. It shows the multifold
opportunities for electronic vetting in daily life. And while it is a system to
screen out immigrants, at the national level and in the national security
context, newly emerging digital watchlisting and database screening
programs such as the No Fly List make clear that database screening is easily
adaptable to other kinds of vetting for various purposes. Those screened or
vetted will individually encounter a purportedly neutral and colorblind
process but with the result that they fall into groups that can start to look
much like the kinds of classifications that would normally offend the
Constitution’s equal protection guarantees.
Consequently, the extreme vetting protocols and the implementation of a
Muslim registry should be understood within the context of delegated
database screening protocols, such as those proposed and passed by Arizona.
As can be seen in the discussion above, the efforts by the federal and state
government to collect and screen data under the auspices of immigrationcontrol policy now extend to a wide range of contexts, including employment
screening and day-to-day policing. This appears to be consistent with datacollection and screening policies under the Trump administration. “Asked
where [Muslims] would be registered, [Trump] said Muslims would be
signed up at ‘different places . . . . [I]t’s all about [data] management.’”357
Candidate Trump specifically referred to the need to deploy DHS identitymanagement technologies: “Trump tied his reasoning for the database to the
need to identify who is in the country legally. ‘It would stop people from
coming in illegally,’ Trump said. ‘We have to stop people from coming into
our country illegally.’”358

356. See Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for a Legal Framework, 43
HARV. C.R-C.L.L. REV. 435, 439–40 (2008).
357. Vaughn Hillyard, Donald Trump’s Plan for a Muslim Database Draws Comparison
to Nazi Germany, NBC NEWS (Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016election/trump-says-he-would-certainly-implement-muslim-database-n466716
[https://perma.cc/RML4-KTZK].
358. Id.
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C. Litigating Algorithmic Jim Crow
The number of individuals and private entities affected by government
identity-management programs is growing as rapidly as the programs
themselves, and future attempts to seek judicially imposed limits on such
programs appear inevitable. The broader question, thus, is not whether the
scientists in Nelson were denied a constitutional right to privacy but whether
any limiting principle can be articulated to curtail the government’s attempt
to engage in post-9/11, semiuniversal vetting and screening systems, such as
the No Fly List, and biometric dataveillance credentialing, such as HSPD-12,
in the name of furthering national security, crime control, and immigration
policy.
Under an “equal but separate” regime, identity-management systems that
purport to collect and sort data of individuals equally, however, may impose
disparate consequences through colorblind vetting protocols and “raceneutral” database screening systems.
Yet, whether biometric-based
identification systems can be presented as colorblind and “race-neutral” is in
doubt. Racial characteristics are among the data collected in biometric
databases. Soft biometric data, for instance, includes digital analysis or
automated determination of age, height, weight, race or ethnicity, color of
skin and color of hair, scars and birthmarks, and tattoos.359 Further, newly
developed big data vetting tools fuse biometric data with biographic data and
internet and social media profiling to algorithmically assess risk. Data fusion
techniques are not race neutral, as recent reports have exposed how data
analytics can result in pinpointing racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic
characteristics through big data analysis tools.360 As plaintiffs in the No Fly
List litigation allege, those disparately impacted by mandatory vetting and
screening protocols will largely fall within traditional classifications—race,
color, national origin, ethnicity, and religion—depending on what may be
determined to be suspect criteria.361
Recent immigration-control policy and programs demonstrate the
government’s interest in delegating immigration-vetting duties to private
actors,362 such as employers, and nonfederal actors, such as state and local
law enforcement363 or their privatized subdelegates,364 which can exacerbate
issues of racial profiling and discrimination. For instance, LAWA and
Arizona’s SB 1070 are examples of immigration federalism and national
security federalism. Immigration federalism traditionally has denoted state
359. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOMETRICS 1235 (Stan Z. Li & Anil K. Jain eds., 2009).
360. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY 56 (2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/databrokers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/G4WC-7NN6].
361. See Complaint at 8–9, Latif v. Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134 (D. Or. 2014) (No. 10CV-750-BR).
362. See Lee, supra note 313, at 1130; Pham, supra note 313, at 780–81; Stumpf, supra
note 328, at 382.
363. See generally Cox & Miles, supra note 329; Lasch, supra note 329.
364. See Jennifer M. Chacón, Privatized Immigration Enforcement, 52 HARV. C.R-C.L.L.
REV. 1, 8 (2017).
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and local efforts to control or mitigate the impact of unwanted migration or
to regulate the admission of noncitizens across state borders.365 In the past
few years, several thousand state and local immigration-related laws have
been considered in almost every state.366 This level of immigration
federalism activity is unprecedented in U.S. history.367
Also unprecedented, however, is the manner in which immigration
federalism is intersecting with two other critical movements in U.S. history:
(1) an increasing reliance on database-sorting technology and dataveillance
in federal immigration policy to facilitate state-federal partnerships in the
control of unwanted migration; and (2) a post-9/11 national security policy
of national security federalism that encourages a state-federal partnership in
the furtherance of intelligence-gathering and homeland security objectives
under a “force multiplier” theory.
In the DHS memos released by then-DHS Secretary John Kelly on
February 21, 2017, which implemented the Executive Orders on immigration
signed by President Trump on January 25, 2017, DHS stated that the
executive branch would apply a “force multiplier” approach to the
immigration-control and national security effort.368 Identity-management
technologies that rely upon the internet and digital databases to verify identity
have been developed to help execute these goals. As a presidential candidate,
Trump explained that immigration-control and counterterrorism efforts
required “a lot of systems, beyond databases.”369
Because these statutes are perceived as targeting primarily those born in
foreign countries but residing here, the questions of government intrusion and
disparate impact are obscured. However, while the state and federal laws at
issue may be immigration laws first, they are still identity-screening laws,
and the entire population—citizens and noncitizens—is subject to their
vetting and screening protocols. Consequently, immigration federalism,
when combined with national security federalism, is driving the exponential
expansion of identity-management programs and biometric-database
screening.
Given the historical connection between mass data collection and mass
discrimination,370 federal courts may require an inquiry into the
365. See Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and Immigration Outside
the Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1729 (2010) (“Only after the Civil War did today’s prevailing
view of immigration federalism—that federal immigration regulation displaces any state laws
on the admission and expulsion of noncitizens—begin to emerge.”).
366. The National Conference of State Legislatures compiles annual reports on state
legislative activity regarding immigration as part of the Immigration Policy Project. See
generally State Laws Related to Immigration and Immigrants, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES
(Aug. 6, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/state-laws-related-to-immigrationand-immigrants.aspx [https://perma.cc/TD2T-5R5F].
367. See id.
368. Memorandum from John Kelly, supra note 330, at 3.
369. Hillyard, supra note 357.
370. See EDWIN BLACK, IBM AND THE HOLOCAUST: THE STRATEGIC ALLIANCE BETWEEN
NAZI GERMANY AND AMERICA’S MOST POWERFUL CORPORATION 21 (2001); Aebra Coe, ExAmbassador Wants Ford, IBM Apartheid Liability Reviewed, LAW360 (Mar. 21, 2016),
https://www.law360.com/articles/773798 [https://perma.cc/G6MR-FL7Z]; Haya El Nasser,
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discriminatory animus in the design of the vetting protocols and the database
screening systems. That inquiry will likely start from an assessment of the
disparate impact of identity-management technologies.
Relatedly,
challengers and the courts must contemplate the disparate impact of the
algorithms themselves, the screening inputs that produce the results, and the
discriminatory result of other data-driven decision-making tools, rather than
in the personal animus of the screener. Judicial review should evolve to
question analytical assumptions and to develop evaluative methods to
interrogate the underlying algorithms informing the screening and vetting
systems.
Challengers and federal courts must also become more aware of other
types of discrimination that can be facilitated by digitalized vetting and
screening protocols. Although “data driven discrimination” is not currently
recognized, we can begin challenging the collection of data under privacy
theories and attempt to limit the ways in which judgments can be made based
on the analysis of such data. Nelson, for example, challenged data-driven
decisions that imposed arbitrary definitions of suitability on moral
proclivities rather than decision-making founded on a secure rational
basis.371
Further, identity-management technologies and Algorithmic Jim Crow
may force innovations in constitutional data-privacy theories. These may
include, for example, asserting a reasonable expectation of privacy under the
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of the search and seizure of data. The
original complaints filed to enjoin LAWA’s mandatory E-Verify database
screening alleged a Fourth Amendment violation.372 Among other
challenges, the Chamber of Commerce argued that E-Verify required an
unconstitutional search and seizure of an employee’s personally identifiable
information by Arizona employers.373 The Fourth Amendment challenge,
however, was not the driving force behind the litigation, was withdrawn by
stipulation before the district court,374 and was not before the Supreme Court
in Whiting, which focused on the question of preemption.375 Although the
United States only challenged section 2(B) of Arizona’s SB 1070 on
preemption grounds, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) had
originally raised other constitutional claims, including a Fourth Amendment
claim, to the implementation of section 2(B), which required mandatory
biometric-database screening of those suspected of unlawful presence.376

Papers Show Census Role in WWII Camps, USA TODAY (Mar. 30, 2007),
https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-03-30-census-role_n.htm
[https://perma.cc/82GL-P5KR]; see also supra notes 132, 134 and accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 253–78 and accompanying text.
372. See Ariz. Contractors Ass’n v. Candelaria, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1061 (D. Ariz.
2008).
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 594 (2011).
376. Valle del Sol v. Whiting, No. CV 10-1061-PHX-SRB, 2012 WL 8021265, at *2 (D.
Ariz. Sept. 5, 2012).
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Once again, the Fourth Amendment claim was not before the Supreme Court
in Arizona, which also focused on preemption.377
It is important to note as well that, similar to Korematsu, the No Fly List
challengers have relied on due process rather than equal protection. As in
Korematsu, the government has defended the No Fly List as a national
security program that does not target classifications of individuals, but,
rather, targets risk. In his dissent in Korematsu, Justice Frank Murphy stated
that “the order deprives all those within its scope of the equal protection of
the laws as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.”378
Of the relationship between due process and equal protection, William
Eskridge has observed that “[t]he Due Process Clause announces a
procedural norm.”379 To the extent that the Due Process Clause is recognized
to carry a substantive element, Eskridge explains the courts demand “a fit
between the reasonableness of the deprivation (whatever the process) and the
‘law of the land.’ The Equal Protection Clause requires the state to justify
any difference in procedural or substantive treatment of one person vis-à-vis
another.”380 Consequently, the Equal Protection Clause may be less useful
than other constitutional options that can force political change, such as the
Due Process Clause and the First Amendment.381
Eskridge suggests, however, that the Due Process Clause can secure
important rights at the individual level.382 He notes that our conception of
due process is more elastic and can track changing standards of social
progress.383 Further,
Perhaps the most fundamental value found in the Due Process Clause is the
idea that the state is obligated to treat every person as a presumptively
worthwhile human being who is entitled to respect and humane treatment.
This principle is the key reason Buck v. Bell and [Korematsu] were wrongly
decided.”384

Eskridge signals that the time might be right to view equal protection and due
process as “interchangeable and interdependent” in the vindication of
individual rights.385
There are benefits to prevailing under an equal protection claim,386
namely, “the Equal Protection Clause alone offers a minority group a
377. See generally Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012).
378. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 234–35 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting)
(“In excommunicating them without benefit of hearings, this order also deprives them of all
their constitutional rights to procedural due process. Yet no reasonable relation to an
‘immediate, imminent, and impending’ public danger is evident to support this racial
restriction, which is one of the most sweeping and complete deprivations of constitutional
rights in the history of this nation in the absence of martial law.”).
379. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Destabilizing Due Process and Evolutive Equal Protection,
47 UCLA L. REV. 1183, 1187 (2000).
380. Id. at 1187–88.
381. Id. at 1214.
382. Id. at 1183.
383. Id. at 1210.
384. Id.
385. Id. at 1216.
386. Id.
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potential constitutional jackpot at the wholesale level, that is, in challenges to
an array of interconnected discriminations in state benefits as well as
burdens.”387 Eskridge posits, however, that due process can yield similar
wholesale benefits to protection as the Equal Protection Clause; under the
Constitution, there is no theoretical or historical limit to extending wholesale
rights to classes of individuals under a due process theory.388 In fact, a
“destabilizing due process” that offers multiple opportunities to challenge
discrimination can result in an “evolutive equal protection.”389 Thus, the
equal protection process may need to be pushed to evolve to realize new
forms of discrimination once the Due Process Clause forces the federal courts
to confront the unreasonableness of wholesale deprivations and the need to
grant wholesale benefits to challengers alleging the infringement.
In the context of Algorithmic Jim Crow, however, the interrelationship
between due process and equal protection is more pragmatic. Challenging
algorithm-driven vetting and screening protocols under due process claims
means demanding answers about the “black box” processes that may flag
individuals as potential risks or threats.390 As the algorithms and dataanalytic processes become more transparent, equal protection violations can
no longer be as easily disguised. This destabilization or disruption of
government deprivations made possible by due process challenges can give
new evaluative impetus to the evolution of the types of protections offered
under the Equal Protection Clause.
Arguably, this process of destabilizing algorithmic due process is already
occurring under due process and equal protection challenges, among others.
The No Work List has been implicated in an equal protection challenge.391
The No Vote List has been challenged392 under section 2 of the Voting Rights

387. Id. (“[T]he Court’s apparent classification-based approach offers a tremendous reward
for groups that can persuade judges that the classification legally defining their group is
suspect.”).
388. Id. at 1216; id. at 1219 (“There may be no deep theoretical or even historical reason
why the Due Process Clause’s principles of fairness, antiarbitrariness, and dignity could not
be applied on the wholesale level.”).
389. Id. at 1186.
390. See PASQUALE, supra note 191, at 101–03; Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due
Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1260 (2008); Citron & Pasquale, supra note 196, at 3–4;
Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress
Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 122 (2014); Hu, supra note 160, at 1759;
Daniel J. Steinbock, Data Matching, Data Mining, and Due Process, 40 GA. L. REV. 1, 3
(2005).
391. See Puente Ariz. v. Arpaio, 76 F. Supp. 3d 833, 842 (D. Ariz. 2015), rev’d in part,
vacated in part, 821 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2016). In Puente, the plaintiffs challenged the
constitutionality of state statutes “that criminalize the act of identity theft done with the intent
to obtain or continue employment.” Id. The state statutes in question required employers to
use E-Verify and included provisions to ensure employers’ participation in the E-Verify
program: the “Legal Arizona Workers Act” and “Employment of Unauthorized Aliens.” Id.
at 844. The district court preliminarily enjoined the enforcement of the statutes, finding that
the plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their equal protection
claim. Id. at 854–56.
392. See Arcia v. Fla. Sec’y. of State, 772 F.3d 1335, 1348 (11th Cir. 2014) (reversing and
remanding the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law to the Secretary of State of
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Act393 and the “90 Day Provision” of the National Voter Registration Act.394
The No Citizenship List has been challenged under both procedural due
process and equal protection claims under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments,395 as well as under the Fourth Amendment.396 In addition, the
subsequent litigation of the No Citizenship List was found to implicate the
Tenth Amendment under the anticommandeering doctrine.397 The No Fly
List and Terrorist Watchlist have been challenged under multiple legal claims
Florida and declaring that the SAVE database screening program for voter purges were in
violation of the 90-day provision of the National Voter Registration Act).
393. Id. The original complaint alleged that the SAVE database screening program aimed
at removing noncitizens from voter registration rolls violated section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act, asserting protection for “citizens . . . having ‘less opportunity than other members of the
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect the representatives of their
choice.’” Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 18, Arcia v. Detzner, 908 F. Supp.
2d 1276 (S.D. Fla. 2012), vacated, 2015 WL 11198230 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2015) (No. 1222282-CIV), 2012 WL 2308560 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2012)).
394. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 393, at 2. The original
complaint also alleged that the SAVE database screening program aimed at removing
noncitizens from voter registration rolls violated section 8(b)(1) of the National Voter
Registration Act, also known as the “90 Day Provision,” with plaintiffs asserting that the
statute “prohibits the systematic purging of eligible voters from the official voter list for the
State of Florida, within 90 days before the date of a primary or general election for Federal
office.” Id.
395. See, e.g., Complaint at 1, Galarza v. Szalczyk, No. 10-cv-06815, 2012 WL 1080020
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2012), 2010 WL 4822758. In the original complaint, the plaintiff brought
an “action under the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the authority of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).” Id. Under the Fifth
Amendment, the plaintiff alleged, “Issuance of an immigration detainer against Plaintiff based
on his Hispanic ethnicity violated his right to be free from discrimination on the basis of
ethnicity under the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment.” Id. ¶ 94. Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, the plaintiff alleged, “Treating Plaintiff as presumptively subject to
detention and removal as an ‘alien’ on the basis of his Hispanic identity violated his rights
under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. ¶ 104. The plaintiff also
alleged due process claims under the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments. Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the complaint alleges that the defendants
violated Plaintiffs right to due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution [by]: a) [i]mprisoning Plaintiff
pursuant to a detainer issued on less than probable cause [and]; b) [f]ailing to give
Plaintiff notice of and an opportunity to be heard regarding the grounds for the
detainer before imprisoning Plaintiff pursuant to it.
Id. ¶ 114. Under the Fifth Amendment, the complaint alleged that the defendants “violated
the Fifth Amendment by acting in the following ways: a) [v]iolating the terms of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1357, as interpreted by the courts, by issuing detainers on less than probable cause; b)
[m]isrepresenting immigration detainers as orders for mandatory detention contrary to 8
C.F.R. § 287.7(a).” Id. ¶ 100.
396. Id. ¶ 90. In the original complaint, the plaintiff also brought an action under the
Fourth Amendment, alleging that “[t]he issuance of the detainer against Plaintiff occurred
without probable cause to believe that he was an ‘alien’ subject to detention and removal. That
issuance constituted an unreasonable seizure in violation of Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourth
Amendment.” Id.
397. See Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 636 (3d Cir. 2014). In Galarza, the Third
Circuit concluded that immigration holds are not mandatory commands, but rather—per the
Tenth Amendment—discretionary for state agencies. Id. Therefore, the court reasoned, a
previously dismissed § 1983 claim against the county that allegedly held the plaintiff was
erroneously dismissed and remanded. Id. at 645.
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and constitutional theories,398 including procedural due process and
substantive due process under the Fifth Amendment.399
Algorithmic Jim Crow may not be challenged successfully on equal
protection grounds, but, rather, on other legal grounds, such as informational
privacy grounds, the legal claim in Nelson. Nelson is especially useful to the
analysis here as it involves a challenge to both a mandatory biometric ID
program and the vetting protocols associated with the program.400 Like the
loyalty requirements imposed by the January 27, 2017, Order,401 the vetting
protocols challenged in Nelson also involved screening criteria to determine
trustworthiness, morality, and suitability—criteria subsequently criticized by
the Court as subjective and objectionable.402
Consequently, legal responses to Algorithmic Jim Crow may require
preconceiving identity-management harms to encompass a broad range of
legal theories. As in the No Fly List litigation, the government will likely
defend disparate-impact consequences as justified based upon risk
assessments, terroristic classifications, data-screening results deemed
These are
suspect, and characteristics establishing unsuitability.403
classifications and characteristics not protected by equal protection
jurisprudence. To acknowledge the harms emerging from Algorithmic Jim
Crow, equality law should be broadened to recognize data-driven
discrimination and recognition of algorithm- and big data-derived disparate
impact, rather than limiting protection to only animus-based, classificationdriven discrimination.
CONCLUSION
Algorithmic Jim Crow regimes are distinguished from historic Jim Crow
regimes in several significant respects.
Algorithmic Jim Crow is
cybersurveillance driven and dataveillance dependent, built around the
transparency of biometric identity and other technologies of identity
management, monitoring internet and social media activity and contact lists
through telephony databases, database screening and digital watchlisting
enforcement, and other emerging big data surveillance techniques. In
contrast, traditional Jim Crow is law driven, built around the transparency of
racial identity; monitoring economic, educational, political, and social

398. See Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 62 F. Supp. 3d 909, 914 (N.D. Cal. 2014)
(challenging Ibrahim’s inclusion on the No Fly List under the First Amendment (freedom of
association and freedom of religion), Fourth Amendment (freedom from unreasonable search
and seizure), Fifth Amendment (procedural due process and substantive due process), and
Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection)).
399. See First Amended Complaint paras. 52–72, Ibrahim, 62 F. Supp. 3d 909 (N.D. Cal.
2014) (No. C06-0545 WHA), 2006 WL 2330786; Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory
Relief paras. 216–255, Latif v. Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134 (D. Or. 2014) (No. 10-CV-750BR).
400. NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 140–42 (2011).
401. See supra notes 298–99 and accompanying text.
402. Nelson, 562 U.S. at 143 n.5.
403. See Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Latif, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134 (D.
Or. 2014) (No. 3:10-cv-00750-BR), 2015 WL 11347548.
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activity; and utilizing traditional criminal enforcement and detention tools as
well as small data surveillance techniques. Algorithmic Jim Crow describes
an “equal but separate” system of de jure and de facto discrimination rather
than the “separate but equal” discrimination of historic Jim Crow.
The goal of Algorithmic Jim Crow is not physical separation per se.
Rather, all individuals subjected to an Algorithmic Jim Crow regime may be
equally vetted through database screening and digital watchlisting systems.
The separation, however, is achieved through data discrimination applied on
the back end of screening and vetting protocols rather than overt social and
economic discrimination and legal apartheid applied on the front end of
segregationist regimes. The “equal but separate” impact of Algorithmic Jim
Crow will likely manifest itself in the big data assessment of risk factors that
purport to predict terroristic and criminal threat rather than segregation
systems of racial or ethnic classification.
In other words, individuals will be at risk of disparate treatment on the
basis of suspicious algorithmic results and anomalous data, or “foreignness”
characteristics. Thus, disparate treatment stemming from cybersurveillance
and dataveillance may not be characterized as traditional discrimination:
discrimination on the basis of a historically protected class, for instance, race,
color, ethnicity, national origin, and sex. This type of identity-management,
technology-based discrimination may, therefore, fall outside current
interpretations of the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause and outside the reach of the protection of civil rights statutes.
Algorithmic vetting and biometric identification, especially once deployed
across an entire citizenry, will likely lead to discriminatory profiling and
surveillance on the basis of suspicious digital data and internet and social
media activity deemed “suspect,” as well as classification-based
discrimination, such as the isolation of those emigrating from Muslimmajority nations. These systems are likely to result in both direct and
collateral discrimination on the basis of citizenship status, national origin,
and religion, in particular. In addition, recent immigration-control policies
and programs demonstrate the government’s willingness to delegate
screening and vetting duties to private actors, such as employers and local
law enforcement, which can exacerbate issues of racial profiling and
discrimination. This discrimination may face limited or lenient review by a
federal judiciary that generally grants broad deference in matters of
immigration and national security.
Because Algorithmic Jim Crow may appear to offer equality in theory, it
may not be challenged successfully on equal protection grounds under the
current equal protection framework. Thus, the jurisprudence must evolve to
encompass new harms and recognize the disparate-impact harms of
Algorithmic Jim Crow regimes. At the same time, Algorithmic Jim Crow
must be challenged under other legal theories, including search and seizure
of data under the Fourth Amendment, procedural due process and
informational privacy rights under substantive due process guarantees of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, First Amendment theories, and other
statutory and constitutional theories. Wholesale disruptions to Algorithmic
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Jim Crow under a wide range of legal theories will likely force an evolution
of equal protection jurisprudence.

